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05/31/2022 08:00 PM EDT
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MR PRICE: Good afternoon.
QUESTION: The freezing room.
MR PRICE: It is very cold here in today. Hot outside and cold in here.
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
[]MR PRICE: Yes, yes. Well, I hope everyone was able to have some time this weekend to perhaps disconnect and focus on what’s important. Before I turn to your questions, just one element at the top today.
As we approach the hundredth day of Russia’s war against Ukraine, we remain concerned about steps Russia is taking to attempt to institutionalize control over sovereign Ukrainian territory, particularly in Ukraine’s Kherson region.
The Kremlin is probably weighing a few approaches: from recognizing a so-called “people’s republic” as Russia forcibly did in Donetsk and Luhansk, to an attempted annexation just as Russia did in Crimea. It’s a predictable part of the Russian playbook, which is why we are continuing to sound the alarm now, particularly following Russian President Putin’s unilateral decree that would fast-track the issuance of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens. Russia used similar tactics in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2019.
In Kherson specifically, multiple reports indicate Russian forces have forcibly removed legitimate Ukrainian Government officials and installed illegitimate pro-Russian proxies. One such proxy, quote/unquote, “governor” was installed in April. In May, another pro-Russia proxy, quote/unquote, “official” publicly stated an intent to appeal to Russia to incorporate the Kherson region by the end of the year. Russia has also forced Kherson residents to adopt the Russian ruble over the legitimate Ukrainian currency, according to multiple accounts.
As of late April, Russia likely controlled at least 25 broadcasting towers in Ukrainian areas under Russian military control, including in the Kherson region, and was airing pro?Russia media channels probably to weaken anti-Russian sentiment and public resistance.
This month, Russian officials have increased visits to Kherson, including a visit by Russia’s deputy prime minister in mid-May during which he publicly stated that Moscow believed Kherson has, quote, “a decent place in our Russian family.” This followed a trip by the head of Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, who said Russia would remain in Kherson “forever.”
The Kremlin has also indicated it could attempt a sham referendum to create a Kherson, quote/unquote, “people’s republic” – even though it lacks any popular or legal legitimacy to do so. Before Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, only about 20 percent of Kherson residents said they viewed Russia warmly, but that support has probably deteriorated since the invasion. Russia is almost certainly failing to gain legitimacy for proxy governments in newly seized territories in Ukraine, as protests persist, and residents refuse to cooperate.
Russia’s initial objectives of controlling large swaths of Ukraine has been nothing short of a complete failure. The Kremlin probably views that forcibly holding Kherson would provide Russia a land bridge to Crimea as well as gaining some kind of so-called victory in an attempt to justify Russia – to Russia’s domestic audiences the thousands of lives Putin’s war of choice has destroyed.
We will continue to spotlight Russia’s territorial designs in Ukraine as well as its ongoing aggression just as we hold to account those who facilitate it, including with additional punitive economic measures. We must also continue to bolster Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the face of the Kremlin’s brutality. And we will have more on all of that in the coming days.
Matt.
QUESTION: Would you like to preview that —
MR PRICE: I —
QUESTION: — more in the coming days?
MR PRICE: You know I’m not in the habit of —
QUESTION: Well —
MR PRICE: — previewing from the podium, but I appreciate the invitation.
QUESTION: When you say – when you say “in the comings days,” like this week obviously, yes?
MR PRICE: Well —
QUESTION: Or coming days meaning like the next —
QUESTION: Or today?
MR PRICE: Well, it’s – so as not to get drawn into a – into a game of definitions, I will leave it at what I said, but add the context that’s – on a couple fronts. Number one, you know that due to the commitment of the United States Congress – the bipartisan commitment of the United States Congress – we now have over $40 billion; and a good portion of that is earmarked for security assistance for our Ukrainian partners.
To date, since the invasion began on February 24th, we have provided our Ukrainian partners with some $3.8 billion in security assistance, well over $4 billion since the course of – during the course of this administration. And now that we have significant additional financial resources for security assistance, I imagine you’ll be hearing from us before too long about additional security assistance as those conversations with senior levels of the Ukrainian Government have been ongoing.
As you know, Secretary Blinken recently had an opportunity to speak to Foreign Minister Kuleba. It is often during those phone calls that among the various topics they discuss is an assessment of Ukraine’s security needs. Kuleba – Foreign Minister Kuleba often passes along the latest requirements and the needs of our Ukrainian partners. We, in turn, then determine what we have in our stocks, what our allies and partners around the world might have in their stocks, and how together we can work to facilitate the provision of weapons systems that are needed and appropriate on the Ukrainian battlefield. And as you know, Secretary Austin is involved in an effort, the contact group that the Pentagon has initiated with many of our partners to help with that.
QUESTION: Well, so the strategy that you believe the Russians are following in terms of territory, is there anything – is there – does that make – change at all your calculus of what kind of weapons to give to the Ukrainians or —
MR PRICE: Well —
QUESTION: — is that more just of a tactical and strategic thing?
MR PRICE: Well, what has changed our assessment of the Ukrainian needs are a couple things. First, it is the course of this conflict. And in the early days, we and our Ukrainian partners in the first instance, of course, were focused on the battle for Kyiv – the battle for Kyiv that our Ukrainian partners of course ultimately won. During the course of that phase of the war, there was a heavy emphasis, as you might expect, on anti-armor, on anti?air systems that ultimately helped enable our Ukrainian partners to emerge victorious from the battle of Kyiv.
QUESTION: Sorry, I don’t want to interrupt, but I don’t want you to – the entire history of it is not something I’m —
MR PRICE: No, no.
QUESTION: I’m looking for —
MR PRICE: It’s one data point.
QUESTION: — have you changed – has – have you changed your calculus about what would be most effective and useful for the Ukrainians like, say, in the last week or two?
MR PRICE: So that was admittedly a very long sentence. The next sentence was going to make the point that as the conflict has shifted to the east and to the south, we of course have changed our assessment; and the needs that our Ukrainian partners have put forward have shifted as well. And so, their top priority in more recent weeks was surging artillery systems and munitions to the front lines. Over the course of the last two presidential drawdown authorities, there have been 108 Howitzer artillery systems. During the course of this phase of the conflict, those systems are already being used on the ground.
So, all that to say as Russia’s tactics on the battlefield have shifted, the needs of our Ukrainian partners have shifted, and in turn we and our partners have adapted to the realities of the ground and provided our Ukrainian partners with precisely what they need to be effective.
Francesco.
QUESTION: Yes, so not only has the conflict shifted in the east and the south, but in the very last days and weeks Russia seems to be advancing more and more in Donbas. What is your view on that, and do you believe that whatever you will be announcing before too long is capable to help Ukrainians reverse that dynamics on the battlefield?
MR PRICE: Well, it is of course no secret that the Russians have significant firepower. We have been very clear all along that even as our Ukrainian partners have demonstrated remarkable effectiveness that has been in many ways enabled by their commitment and grit, and bravery and tenacity, and of course the security assistance that the United States and our partners around the world have provided, that they would be met with an aggressive force that the Russians continue to field on sovereign Ukrainian territory, that the Russian forces continue to inflict from the ground, from the air, from the skies, and even from the seas.
And so, no one has been under any illusions that the war, the course of the war, the trajectory of Ukrainian success would be perfectly linear. But what we are confident in is the fact that our Ukrainian partners will continue to have what they need to mount an effective defense against Russia’s aggression. And we remain confident in the most important point, and that is that when this is over, what will continue to be the case is that Ukraine will be democratic, independent, sovereign, and prosperous. And the United States will continue to partner with our Ukrainian partners during each and every phase of this conflict. The nature of that partnership will shift as we provide our Ukrainian partners precisely what they need to be effective. We’ve already shifted given the tactical realities on the battlefield. I have a feeling that we will continue and am confident we will continue to be nimble as the battle moves forward.
Humeyra.
QUESTION: Ned, so in terms of providing what they need, they’ve been asking for long-range weapons, and the President over the weekend said Washington was not willing to send them systems that can hit Russia, hit inside Russia. But then they actually do have some systems that have the capability of hitting inside Russia. So, could you clarify, like, what exactly the U.S. policy is there? Where do you guys draw the line?
[]MR PRICE: Well, we continue to consider a range of systems that have the potential to be effective on the battlefield for our Ukrainian partners, but the point the President made is that we won’t be sending long-range rockets for use beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
The core point is this: It is Russia that is and has attacked Ukraine. It is Russia that is starting – that has started this war. It is Russian forces that are inside sovereign Ukrainian territory. And these are the forces that our Ukrainian partners are fighting back against. This is not a battle of aggression for our Ukrainian partners. This is about self-defense for them. This is about preserving their country, their freedom, their democracy, their prosperity and independence. And so every element of our security assistance has been geared towards that goal, and that is the goal of self-defense; it’s the goal of, in many ways, self-preservation for our Ukrainian partners.
So it is no secret – and I just made the case – that as the battle has shifted its dynamics, we have also shifted the type of assistance, the security assistance that our Ukrainian partners – that we are providing to them, in large part because they have asked us for the various systems that are going to be more effective in places like the Donbas, where the battle and the fight is quite different from what they encountered around the battle of Kyiv.
QUESTION: But, I mean, the whole idea of self-defense can also be pretty subjective, and so do you guys have, like, a clear criteria or benchmark for Ukrainians where and at what stages, like, these systems that you send them can be used or should be used, shouldn’t be used?
MR PRICE: There is nothing —
QUESTION: You guys are stepping into, like, gray area here.
MR PRICE: There is nothing subjective or even gray about the notion that Russian forces are inside sovereign Ukrainian territory, taking aim, killing Ukrainian defenders, but also civilians – men, women, and children. There is nothing subjective about that whatsoever. What we are providing our Ukrainian partners, what we have provided them and what we’ll continue to provide them, is designed to enable their efforts to defend their country, to defend their freedom, their independence, and their democracy.
QUESTION: Okay. I’m going to assume that you’re not going to answer this. So, I’ll move on to just one – (laughter) – yeah – one other thing —
QUESTION: Good assumption.
QUESTION: — yeah, one other thing on Ukraine. So there seems to be some growing divergence between some Western European nations like France and Germany and Washington and UK on the long-term goals of the war. The first group seems to suggest that arming Ukraine with such heavy weapons could prolong the war and perhaps, like, Russia shouldn’t be fully antagonized. I mean, what is U.S. response to that kind of thinking? And after three months and the week, do you fully believe that Ukraine is 100 percent able to win this war and you’re going to support them for as long as you want? This is related to the whole territorial – potentially territorial concessions debate that started last week.
MR PRICE: So, I will just make the point that there have been many eulogies written prematurely when it comes to the unity of the international community in support of Ukraine. We heard this prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th; we have heard this at a regular cadence ever since. At every step, the alliance and the system of partnerships that the United States has been indispensable in forging in the months that preceded Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but also since the earliest days of this administration – they have defied those expectations. And I’m not surprised that we continue to hear those eulogies once again, but I am confident and I know that they are premature.
We are united with our allies and partners – in this case, with our NATO Allies, with the some 30 additional allies and partners across four continents that have come together to provide security assistance for our Ukrainian partners, but also to hold Russia to account. And we’re united in that goal. We want to see – and we are confident we will see – a Ukraine that continues to be, when this is all said and done, democratic, independent, sovereign, and prosperous. That is our goal. We will continue to provide our Ukrainian partners with precisely what they need to wage that campaign of self-defense effectively.
I have a hard time understanding the argument that this is about – or this could potentially possibly antagonize Russia, when again, it is Russia that started this war. It is Russia that is on sovereign Ukrainian territory. It is Russia that is raining down missiles and shells and shrapnel and bullets on Ukrainian defenders, but also innocent civilians. So, the argument that Russia could somehow be antagonized doesn’t seem to have much credibility.
There is one country, similarly, that has within its hands the possibility of seeing an end to this war tomorrow, and that, too, is Russia. How and when this war comes to a close, that of course will be a matter for the Ukrainian Government to ultimately decide. The Ukrainian Government has been clear, just as we have, that this will need to be ended diplomatically through dialogue, through engagement. We are under the assessment that Russia is not yet at the point where it is ready to engage in good faith, to engage constructively towards what has to be the objective. That is, in the first instance, diminution of the violence, and ultimately an end to this war.
So, in the meantime, we are going to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, including with the security assistance so that they continue to prosecute the mission of defending their country, their freedom, their democracy, just as we continue to hold Russia to account, including with financial sanctions and export controls and other measures.
Said.
QUESTION: You said that —
QUESTION: Hold on a second. You actually said – I’ve been meaning to ask you this for – this is very brief – when you keep talking about these – all these countries across four continents, you’re counting Australia as a continent and not part of Asia, right?
MR PRICE: I believe that’s the case, yes.
QUESTION: Okay. So when you talk about, then, Asia – presumably this is North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. What Asian countries are actually contributing weapons? Or are you talking about, like, they’ve – some, like Japan and South Korea, have imposed sanctions?
MR PRICE: There are – there’s a broad coalition of countries that have come together to provide security assistance and to hold Russia to account.
QUESTION: So both. And Australia as a continent, not a country?
MR PRICE: I will leave it to these individual countries to discuss their contributions.
QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.
MR PRICE: But certainly, several of our Asian allies have been stalwart members of this campaign.
Yes, Said.
QUESTION: Ned, you said that only one country can bring this war to an end. You also said when all this is said and done, and so on. I want to ask you about – what is in it for Russia? I mean diplomatically. I mean, of course everybody wants to see the war end and the conflict (inaudible) and so on. But what are you willing to give the Russians in exchange – you and those in coalition? Would you, let’s say, give a commitment that Ukraine could never become a member of NATO, that you will look at the Russian points of concern, the security demands or whatever, that were made back in December, and all these things?
[]MR PRICE: Said, I think that is a question that may rest on a faulty premise. I don’t believe it is for us to have to answer what a country that is waging a war of choice, a war of aggression, an unnecessary – a needless war should get in return for waging that war.
QUESTION: So just so I understand you properly, you’re saying that Russia should end the war and then we can talk about other issues, if they are there. Is that what you’re saying?
MR PRICE: That wasn’t my point. My point was that this needs to come to a close. It can only come to a close through dialogue and diplomacy. So, there needs to be that diplomatic process. It is currently our assessment that Russia, at the present moment, is not inclined to engage in dialogue and diplomacy that could, in the near term, lead to a diminution of violence and an end to this war.
That is why we are using the tools at our disposal – including our security assistance, including our broader support for the Ukrainian Government and for the Ukrainian people, and the measures that we have on the other side of the ledger to hold Russia to account – to change those dynamics, to change Moscow’s calculus, to induce it to the negotiating table so that together with our Ukrainian partners they can determine how best to chart that path leading to a diminishment of the violence and ultimately to an end to this war.
QUESTION: Yeah, can I follow up on a question that Humeyra had moved on. In terms of why administration says what it says, when it comes to the long-range weapons, Medvedev said all weekend that if any of our cities like get under attack Russian army forces will strike back, not only to Kyiv but also to quote/unquote “criminal decision-making centers.” Do you – first, do you consider Moscow a criminal decision-making center, given the fact that Russia has been striking on Ukrainian cities for 100 days? And secondly, why don’t you recognize Ukraine’s right to strike back? Because so many analysts, military experts believe that Ukraine possessing those weapons actually will help them to combat Russia, not being defensive.
MR PRICE: So, I’m not aware that we’ve used the term criminal – sorry what was the term? “Criminal decision-making center”?
QUESTION: “Decision-making center.”
MR PRICE: I’m not aware that we’ve used that specific term. But we have put forward our assessment that Russia’s forces have committed war crimes – in other words, they have committed criminal acts on the battlefield, so there is at least some element there that we will continue to pursue justice and accountability for what not only Russia’s forces have done but all those in the decision-making apparatus, those who are responsible for these crimes against humanity, the atrocities, the war crimes that have taken place.
Second, what has always been at stake here is Ukraine’s right to exist. We heard a number of arguments that were entirely specious, leading up to Moscow’s February 24th invasion. We heard about purported security concerns; we heard about concerns over what they stated to be NATO’s aggressive nature, claiming a defensive alliance was anything but. In the end, what this came down to was we think President Putin’s belief that Ukraine has no right to exist as a sovereign, independent, democratic, and free country. And so that is what our support, that is what the support of many of the world’s countries, dozens of the world’s countries, has been all about, is making sure that Ukraine will continue to be and to exist and to be precisely what President Putin has sought to deny it, and that is its independence, its sovereignty, its democratic identity, and its prosperity.
So, our assistance to Ukraine has been focused in the area of self-defense. This has been a war of aggression on the part of one country, and that’s Russia. This has been a war of self-defense on the part of our Ukrainian partners.
Yes, Michel.
QUESTION: Then how do you view Foreign Minister Lavrov visit to Saudi Arabia and Turkey? And what do you expect them to hear from your allies in the region?
[]MR PRICE: When it comes to his visit with our GCC partners, we have held extensive discussions with our GCC partners about the importance of international support for Ukraine, as it defends its sovereignty, as it defends its independence. We have conveyed to our partners – we’ve had many opportunities to discuss the need for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory and the cessation of Putin’s war of choice in conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov.
We understand that the GCC plans to push for an end to the conflict and the restoration of the flow of agricultural goods out of Ukraine to ease food prices and shortages and our Gulf partners understand the very acute, the very real implications, and far-reaching implications of President Putin’s war against Ukraine. In many ways, some of our partners in the Gulf, some of our partners in North Africa, and far beyond have been on the frontlines or a frontline of this conflict, because they have been affected by the acute rise in food and commodity prices that is affecting their people and their governments as well.
Similarly, when it comes to foreign minister Lavrov’s travel to Turkey, we understand and we certainly support the diplomatic efforts that our Turkish allies are forging in an effort to bring this war to a close, in the first instance diminish the violence, and also to find ways to facilitate the export of Ukrainian foodstuffs, including Ukrainian wheat. That is also something we support. I understand this visit is not going to be for several days, and we’ll defer to our Turkish counterparts to comment on it.
QUESTION: On Turkey, over the weekend Erdo?an said the military operation in Syria could happen suddenly. Does the U.S. have any indications that a Turkish operation is imminent? And what sort of assurances I guess are you offering Kurdish partners, if any?
MR PRICE: What kind of assurances are we offering —
QUESTION: Kurdish – our Kurdish partners in Syria.
[]MR PRICE: Well, we said this last week when this proposal was first raised, but we remain deeply concerned about discussions of potential increased military activity in northern Syria, and in particular, its impact on the civilian population there. We continue, as we’ve said before, to support the maintenance of current ceasefire lines. We would condemn any escalation that has the potential to jeopardize that. We believe it is crucial for all sides to maintain and respect ceasefire zones, principally to enhance stability in Syria and to work towards a political solution to the conflict. We believe that any effort to do otherwise could be counterproductive to our goals to bring about an end to the broader conflict in Syria, but also the tremendous progress that we’ve made together, including with our Kurdish partners, in the effort against ISIS that has achieved such important steps in recent years.
We do expect Turkey to live up to the October 2019 joint statement, including to halt offensive operations in northeastern Syria. And we recognize Turkey’s legitimate security concerns on its border. But again, we are concerned that any new offensive would further undermine regional stability and would put at risk those hard-won gains in the campaign against ISIS.
QUESTION: So Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was unable to eke an omnibus deal with the Pacific Island countries during his recent visit. The subsequent statement that was released by China’s embassy to the U.S. was absent a discussion of security cooperation between China and the Pacific Island countries he visited, including cooperation on data networks and cybersecurity that was reportedly part of China’s original communique leaked before Foreign Minister Wang’s trip. Do you have any reaction to these developments, both the lack of a deal and the Chinese embassy’s subsequent statement?
[]MR PRICE: Well, we’ll leave it to the parties involved to offer their assessment of what happened. We, of course, have all seen the reports that have emanated from the region and with Pacific Island nations expressing concern about signing on to the PRC’s proposal. We’ve made this point before, and the Secretary even made it in his speech on our approach to the People’s Republic of China last week, and that is this: Each nation will make its own sovereign decisions. We together with our allies and partners, including those in the region, have made our concerns clear about the PRC’s shadowy, unspecified deals with little regional consultations. We are committed to continue deepening our relationship with our Pacific Island partners and in the Indo-Pacific, including working together to deliver for our people.
I’d make one final point – and as this has been reported out, we’ve seen reports of regional and international media being blocked or encountering significant obstacles when attempting to cover the foreign minister visit to the region and the PRC so-called cooperation proposals. In Samoa, for example, the media were not allowed to question either the Samoan prime minister or Foreign Minister Wang during the visit. In Fiji, Fujian and Australian reporters covering the visit highlighted on social media a kerfuffle ahead of the meeting with the PIF secretary general, as PRC officials attempted unsuccessfully to block their entrance. In the Solomon Islands, there were calls to boycott the press conference due to the restrictions that the PRC imposed.
When we talk about these opaque, shadowy deals, I think you need only look at what many of your counterparts and colleagues around the world have reported about the PRC’s efforts to obscure these very deals themselves, to – to even go so far as to prevent officials in the region from facing reporters in their own country, and of course, preventing the PRC foreign minister from having to answer to independent media who would ask the sorts of tough questions that he would surely get.
MR PRICE: Is kerfuffle – that’s a technical diplomatic term, right?
MR PRICE: This was a term that was taken from a tweet.
Yes. Let me move around. Yes, Gitte.
QUESTION: Thanks, Ned. The IAEA’s latest report on Iran is out and it’s been leaked, and it doesn’t look good for Iran. Talks about the – more violations and of course not clarifying things from the past for the IAEA. Last week at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rob Malley was asked if the U.S. was going to support a censure of Iran at next week’s Board of Governors meeting. Has a decision – well, Rob said that the U.S. was consulting with the European allies. Has a decision been made yet?
[]MR PRICE: I don’t have a decision to announce today, but what I can say is this: we fully support the IAEA director general, the efforts of the IAEA as a whole to engage Iran on the need to provide the necessary cooperation in order to resolve the open safeguards issues in Iran. Just as the IAEA is concerned, we share those concerns. We have full faith and confidence in the IAEA. And as we previously said, Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.
Because this report is not public, we’re not in a position to comment more fully. But we will continue to work closely with allies and partners and the Board of Governors of the IAEA to ensure that the board takes appropriate action in response to the director general’s reporting. These unresolved safeguard issues, I think it is worth noting, relate to legal obligations under the MPT-required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. That of course is separate from Iran’s JCPOA nuclear-related commitments. It remains our goal to see to it that Iran is once again bound by those JCPOA related nuclear commitments. And that is why we are proceeding with determining whether we can achieve a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA.
QUESTION: And —
QUESTION: Ned, have you —
MR PRICE: Let met – let me let Gitte ask a follow-up.
QUESTION: And a question about inside of Iran. Since last week when a tall building collapsed – and, so far, about 40 corpses have been pulled out – demonstrations – people have been demonstrating and by now there are dozens of cities following suit with the people of Abadan. There’s a number of slogans and chants that keep being repeated in different demonstrations every now and then, but one stands out that is being repeated again and was repeated yesterday, the translation of which is: our enemy is right here; they lie that it is America. Do you have any comments, any messages to the Iranian people who are chanting this slogan, that are saying their own establishment is lying to them and that America is not the Iranian people’s enemy?
MR PRICE: We have spoken very clearly about the ongoing protests in Iran. We have also in the past spoken directly to the people of Iran. Last year when we first addressed what were then – what started as protests over water shortages and of course evolved from there, we sent a very clear message to the Iranian people that remains true today. It was a message of the fact that we stand with you, we stand with the Iranian people who are trying to make their voices heard, and that we call on the Iranian Government to respect the right of the Iranian people to peaceful protest, and not to repress what are their fundamental demands.
This is a message that of course applies not only to the people of Iran – the right to peaceful assembly, the right to peaceful protest, the right to freedom of expression. These are universal rights that apply equally to the Iranian people as they do to any other people around the world. We will continue to stand for those rights with those people, voicing those rights who are doing so peacefully consistent with their rights.
QUESTION: Ned, sorry, the safeguard concerns that you mentioned just now, the – these are longstanding concerns. They’re not new in this new report. If you support the BOG, as I like to call it, the Board of Governors taking responsible action to do this, why have you opposed it and even blocked it – action from the —
MR PRICE: The —
QUESTION: — Board of Governors in the past when these – when these shortcomings – these concerns have been raised?
MR PRICE: Matt, we have been very clear that we believe that the concerns of the IAEA have to be resolved and they have to be resolved swiftly. Again, we have full faith and confidence in the IAEA. We support the important mission that it is doing inside of Iran. The decisions of the Board of Governors, those are the decisions of the Board of Governors. We consult closely with our fellow members of the board, but again, we fully – we fully support the need to resolve these issues.
QUESTION: But Ned, last November there was a push to get the board to take up this question – these questions and concerns about safeguards, and you guys stopped it.
MR PRICE: Matt, I’m —
QUESTION: Why all of a sudden are you saying now it’s time for the board to take action?
MR PRICE: We have always said —
QUESTION: Or are you going to oppose it again?
MR PRICE: We have always said that outstanding safeguards issue, including the ones that we’ve referenced today, need to be resolved. We are not under any illusions about the Iranian Government and what they have —
QUESTION: Okay. But why have you – why have you opposed them – the board dealing with it in the past?