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05/10/2022 07:27 PM EDT
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
Washington, D.C.
2:02 p.m. EDT
MR PRICE: Good afternoon. We’ll do something extraordinary today and start on time, and also without a topper. So dangerous as that might be, I’ll turn right to your questions. Daphne.
[]QUESTION: Ukraine has said it would suspend the flow of gas through a transit point that delivers almost a third of the fuel piped from Russia to Europe through Ukraine. Will the U.S. need to increase LNG exports to Europe given this move, and does it change the timeline at all for more U.S. or EU tightened sanctions on Russian energy?
MR PRICE: Well, it doesn’t change one timeline, and that is the timeline associated with lessening global dependence on Russian oil. And the timeline associated with that is as soon as possible. As you know, the United States, countries around the world, have already taken steps – the United States took steps last month through an executive order – to ban the import of Russian oil, of Russian energy. Other countries have followed suit using their own authorities. Blocs of countries are having these discussions about how best they can do that.
So I think what we’ve heard today only reinforces what we already knew. We knew that there has to be a near-term response to the disruptions in the global energy market that President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has caused. And as you’ve heard from us in recent weeks, we have been in close coordination, in close touch with allies and partners around the world to surge energy supplies, in some cases tapping strategic petroleum reserves – in the case of the United States, tens of millions of barrels from our strategic petroleum reserve; other countries have made similar investments in their own strategic petroleum reserves – to ensure that supplies of energy are where they need to be for countries that need it in this interim period.
And I call it an interim period because our goal over the longer term is to see to it that we take steps to lessen dependence on Russian energy. Part of that is going to be the transition away from fossil fuels towards renewables, towards green technology; that will help with that. But part of that, too, will be finding longer-term sustainable ways to ensure that our partners, especially those partners on the front lines who have found themselves over the course of years or even decades reliant on Russian energy flows, to see to it that they have other options to fulfill their energy needs. So that’s something we’re working on, including in the context of the U.S.-EU energy task force that President Biden established with his European counterpart a number of weeks ago.
Francesco.
QUESTION: I have a quick one on Ukraine. Senators Graham and Blumenthal introduced a resolution today asking the Secretary to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. Can you update us on the process, if there is one, to determine whether Russia will qualify as a state sponsor of terrorism? Is that something you’re —
MR PRICE: Aware of that resolution, aware of Congress’s interest in this matter, and of course of Congress’s broader interest in our approach to Russia and Ukraine. What I can say is that the state sponsor of terrorism statute is a statute, not to be too subtle about it. And that means that it is something – the criteria by which states are designated or not, those are not up to us. Those are up to Congress.
What is up to us is to take a close look at the law, to take a close look at the facts – that is to say, what Russia is doing, whether it’s in Ukraine, whether it’s in countries around the world – to determine whether that fact pattern fits the criteria that is laid out in the statute. So that’s something that we’re always looking at, not only with this authority but with every authority that we have.
The broader point is that we are going to pull every appropriate level – lever, excuse me – we can to apply pressure on the Russian Federation until and unless its brutal invasion of Ukraine, its brutal aggression against Ukraine, comes to a halt. And the fact is that together with dozens of countries across four continents, we have applied our own sanctions, we’ve used international authorities as well, to not only apply sanctions, but also export controls.
And so the practical effect is that much of what various authorities call for have already been put in place, given what we’ve already done vis-à-vis our own authorities and what other countries have done in terms of their authorities. But we’ll continue to watch and to determine whether Russia’s actions in Ukraine merit and qualify for additional authorities. If we feel those authorities are appropriate, we won’t hesitate to apply them.
QUESTION: Does that just mean that at this stage, it doesn’t qualify, it doesn’t meet the criteria?
MR PRICE: We’re always looking at the facts and the law, and we’ll continue to do that.
QUESTION: Can you talk a little bit about terrorism designations in general, whether they are FTO designations or state sponsor designations? And will you – are you willing to say what a lot of people say privately, which is it’s just a bit of show, and in terms of the two cases that we’re looking at right now, the IRGC and Russia, that in fact most if not all of what could be done if these designations were, one, kept, or added, would be exactly the same as what you – this administration and previous administrations have already been doing?
MR PRICE: Well, I think your point is well taken, that there are various authorities we can use when it comes to the IRGC, to take that one example. It is an entity that is among the most heavily sanctioned entities on the face of the planet. In addition to the FTO, there are a number of other authorities that are used to constrain and constrict its activities and those of its leadership and its proxies as well. I used this data point the other day.
But of the 107 sanctions the Biden administration has imposed on Iran, 86 of those – some three-quarters – have been applied against the IRGC or its proxies. So the fact is that we do have a number of tools, but whether it’s the SST, whether it’s the FTO designation, both of these things are defined by statute. And —
QUESTION: Well, yeah. Understood. But, I mean, isn’t the administration a little bit frustrated that people seem to be making political points out of this – out of both of these things?
MR PRICE: Matt, we’re cognizant of the town we live in.
QUESTION: And?
MR PRICE: I – we are closely examining the facts and the law with all of these things. That applies equally to the state sponsor of terrorism designation as it does to the FTO.
QUESTION: Well, but for people who have been around for a long time, including those in this building, including the advisor’s office and others, do you think either of these decisions, they go the way that the critics suspect they will? That it won’t make any difference at all?
MR PRICE: I don’t know what the critics – what they expect. What I do know is that we are going to follow the law. We’re going to do what’s in our national security interest when it comes to every authority under the sun and whether the target of those authorities is Iran, Russia, any other state actor, or non-state actor.
But since you have raised Congress, I will walk through this open door and point out the fact that our assistance to Ukraine has been, just as we promised, massive. We have provided $4.5 billion worth of security assistance to Ukraine since the start of this administration, some $3.8 billion worth of security assistance since the invasion began. These are supplies, weapons, that – precisely what Ukraine needs to defend itself. We started doing this well in advance of the Russian invasion. We started doing it last summer. We did it again in December in advance of the invasion, and of course we have announced multiple drawdowns during the course of this invasion. We are now at our ninth presidential drawdown.
The fact, however, is that right now our coffers in terms of drawdown funding, they are dwindling, and after providing $3.8 billion worth of security assistance since the start of the invasion, we now have less than $100 million left. And we will exhaust those funds within the next week.
And so Secretary Blinken, together with Secretary Austin, they have conveyed a very simple message to congressional leadership. The message is: We need your help. We need Congress’s help to see to it that the strategy that President Biden pledged before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strategy we have pursued in the midst of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the strategy that has proved effective in helping our Ukrainian partners be effective at defending their country, that is a strategy that requires funding and a strategy for which funding will be exhausted in key ways as of next week.
We view the request that is before Congress now, the supplemental budget request, as vital in terms of what these funds will enable us to do, as well as the message they would send in terms of bipartisan support, in terms of the Executive Branch, the Hill, Americans of all stripes, for the people of Ukraine who are waging this fight to preserve their freedom, to preserve their democracy, and to preserve their country.
This additional assistance we’ve requested, the brunt of our supplemental emergency request was in fact for security assistance, precisely what our Ukrainian partners need to defend themselves. That includes artillery, armored vehicles, advanced air defense systems, all for Ukraine. This funding will also go beyond the security realm. It will help Ukraine keep schools open. It will help replenish the – and stockpile in support of U.S. troops on NATO territory. It will help our Ukrainian partners, and also our NATO Allies, do precisely what we feel it is imperative that they be positioned to do at this moment.
Nazira.
QUESTION: I don’t remember asking about the assistance, but thank you for the four-minute exposition.
MR PRICE: Before you arrived, and I will point out that you arrived late, for the cameras —
QUESTION: I did.
MR PRICE: — I said there would be no topper, so I wanted to make up for that.
QUESTION: Fair enough.
[]MR PRICE: Yes. Nazira.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Price. First of all, thank you very much for yesterday’s – your answer. Afghan women, they are so happy. But they still ask me and ask you that what option United States will bring to Taliban if they didn’t fix themself about women’s job. This is regular job that every Afghan do it, we don’t have any problem, but like that, it’s unacceptable for Afghan women. And also Afghan people ask, based off your opinion: Why United States failed to fix Afghanistan during this 20 years? Thank you, sir.
MR PRICE: Thank you. So let me start by following up on the conversation we had yesterday about some of the very disturbing, very concerning edicts we’ve heard from the Taliban. Of course, what we’ve heard in recent days regarding the requirement for women’s attire, what we’ve heard about the restrictions on girls attending secondary schools, and other steps – all of these have been deeply concerning. And it’s not only concerning to us; in some ways, much more importantly, it is much more important that it is deeply concerning to Afghans across their country, across Afghanistan. They have voiced their opposition to this edict that proposes severe limitations on half of Afghanistan’s population, and that effectively limits and constricts the ability of half of Afghanistan’s population to participate fully in Afghan society.
So combined with the continuing ban on girls’ secondary education, restrictions on freedom of movement and targeting of peaceful protesters, the Taliban’s policies towards women are an affront to human rights and they will continue to impair their – the Taliban’s relations with the international community, including with the United States. We are discussing these developments with our partners around the world. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seeks from the international community, they know that it depends on their conduct, including and centrally their protection on the rights of women and girls.
These are commitments that the Taliban has made privately. These are commitments, again, much more importantly, that they have made publicly to their own people, and these are the commitments on which we are going to base and we are going to judge any future relationship that we will have with the Taliban. And we know that other countries feel similarly. Other countries with whom we’ve worked closely on Afghanistan since August of last year and well before August of last year do feel similarly.
In the interim, we’ve paused nearly all senior-level engagement with the Taliban in response to the Taliban’s decision in March to prevent girls from attending secondary education. We do remain concerned about these other restrictions that we talked about. We believe, first and foremost, that the Taliban should respond to the Afghan people whose rights the Taliban have pledged, once again, publicly to respect. We have heard that very message from our Afghan partners in recent days. Tom West, our special representative for Afghanistan; Rina Amiri, our special representative for Afghan – for women and girls; Ian McCary, our representative who is now based on Doha, have heard that message from Afghan interlocutors in recent days.
Our Afghan partners tell us that they have seen a disturbing pattern of restrictions on their rights that doesn’t reflect the cultural diversity or their hopes for Afghanistan’s future. It also doesn’t reflect what they heard, what the world heard from the Taliban. This, of course, brings back painful memories of the Taliban from the 1990s. We remain, as I said before, in close communication with our allies and partners regarding our shared concern with what we’ve seen. And again, the Taliban’s responsiveness to the demands of the Afghan people and to the expectations of the international community will define not only our relationship with the Taliban, but the world’s relationship with the Taliban. We know that we cannot have a normal relationship with the Taliban until they respect fully the rights of all of the people of Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Hold on. So what are you going to do? Can I ask – re-ask my question from yesterday? So what are you going to do? I don’t understand. I mean, I saw that some people wrote, oh, U.S. says it’s going to take measures to – if the Taliban doesn’t reverse these decisions, but what measures have you taken or are you going to take? And you haven’t taken any, even though they have done these offensive things that you say going back more than a month now. So what exactly are you going to do and why should anyone believe you when you say we’re going to punish the Taliban or we’re going to take steps to make our disapproval clear?
MR PRICE: First, Matt, we have led the world, as you know, in providing humanitarian relief and humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.
QUESTION: You have, but you also led the world in withdrawing —
MR PRICE: So I think our credibility when it comes to —
QUESTION: — from Afghanistan and allowing the Taliban to take control then, right?
MR PRICE: — when it comes to the concern of – when it comes to the humanitarian concerns of the Afghan people, I think we have established our leadership on that.
QUESTION: Did the United States lead the world in withdrawing from Afghanistan and allowing the Taliban to take control again?
MR PRICE: Matt —
QUESTION: Yes or no? Yes, right? I mean, you can’t deny that, can you?
MR PRICE: I would absolutely reject the premise of the question that the United States allowed the Taliban to take the capital. And Matt, we can relitigate questions that have been litigated for the past 20 years about an investment that we have made in a country, including with treasure and, more importantly, bloodshed on the part of this country and the assessment of this President that the presence of some 2,500 troops who would once again be involved in a civil war, who would be targeted, who would have a target on their back not only by the Taliban but also by elements like ISIS-K, a 2,500-strong contingent that would not – in the end – would have been able to prevent the Taliban or any larger force from coming to power.
So you can argue with the decision that the President made to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. We are confident in that decision. We know what’s in our national interest. We also know what we can accomplish without having a contingent of military – a military deployment on foreign soil. And that’s what we’re trying to do with our humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian assistance that we have provided to the people of Afghanistan since August of last year has led the world, just as our provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan prior to August of last year has led the world.
QUESTION: But this administration has always – has also said that human rights is its number one or one of its top priorities in terms of foreign policy, and —
MR PRICE: Central to our foreign policy.
QUESTION: Exactly. It doesn’t seem to be so central here.
MR PRICE: It is central —
QUESTION: Other than you —
MR PRICE: It is – it is —
QUESTION: — continuing to make statements and that —
MR PRICE: Matt, but you seem to be accusing us of what the Taliban is doing to the people of Afghanistan, and —
QUESTION: No, no, I’m not accusing anyone of anything. I’m asking you what you’re doing to —
MR PRICE: And I am telling you – I am telling you we are doing —
QUESTION: — prevent this or to show your displeasure other than coming out with —
QUESTION: Saying it.
QUESTION: — saying it, writing a nasty letter.
MR PRICE: I can assure you we are doing more than saying it. We are —
QUESTION: Okay. There’s been a lot of talk about reopening the embassy in Kyiv. Is there any discussion about going – sending people back to Kabul?
MR PRICE: I am not aware of any discussion right now about reopening the embassy in Kabul.
QUESTION: Okay. Is it your – is it your belief, though, that Kabul is a war zone in the same way that Kyiv —
MR PRICE: There – there are a couple elements we look at. Safety and security is always at the top of that list. We also look at the propriety of what is appropriate in terms of diplomatic representation, whether it’s in Afghanistan, whether it’s —
QUESTION: Okay. So one of the things – are you saying that one of the things you are doing to show your displeasure with the Taliban is not reopening the embassy?
MR PRICE: What I’m saying is that we are not in a position to reopen the embassy. There are a number of factors that go into that. Safety and security is, of course, one, but also we take a look at the propriety of diplomatic representation around the world.
Our point is that we will judge the Taliban and any future relationship we might one day have with the Taliban based on their conduct, based on their willingness to live up to the public commitments they’ve made to the world. First and foremost is human rights, protecting the rights of the Afghan people, including its women, its girls, its minorities; living up to its counterterrorism commitments; living up to the fact that no entity should be holding an American hostage. We’ve discussed, of course, the case of Mark Frerichs. We’ll continue to work to secure his freedom. There are a number of elements that go into our – any relationship we might one day have with the Taliban. But I can assure you that human rights is central to that list.
[]QUESTION: Can we move to U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Yeah. So how – on U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, especially on Myanmar or Burma, how does the United States plan to work with ASEAN to hold the military junta further accountable for the coup and the violence afterwards?
MR PRICE: Well, we support ASEAN’s decision to invite nonpolitical representatives from Burma to high-level ASEAN events absent progress on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus that was put forward. We will follow ASEAN’s precedent for the upcoming U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, and we’re going to continue to follow that precedent because the regime has demonstrably failed to make progress on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and it continues to escalate its violence, its repression against the people of Burma.
We continue to support in the meantime ASEAN’s efforts to press the regime to urgently and to fully implement the Five-Point Consensus and including an immediate and meaningful visit by the ASEAN special envoy and facilitation of his engagement with all stakeholders, including representatives of the pro-democracy movement. Our partnership with ASEAN is central to returning Burma back to the path of democracy. I certainly expect it will be a topic of discussion as ASEAN leaders descend on Washington, descend on this building later this week, and we reaffirm our commitment to the Burmese people and we will continue to promote a just and meaningful resolution to the crisis in Burma to help return Burma to that democratic path.
QUESTION: Are more U.S. sanctions against the junta on the table?
MR PRICE: We will always look for ways to promote additional accountability for the military coup, for the related violence, for the repression, for the human rights abuses that have followed in the wake of the coup. As you know, we don’t preview specific sanctions or specific steps, but we’re always looking for ways to hold accountable those responsible.
QUESTION: If I may —
[]QUESTION: Just speaking of upcoming regional summits to be held in the United States – do you know where I’m going here?
MR PRICE: You could be speaking of the COVID —
QUESTION: No, no, I would be speaking of the Summit of the Americas.
MR PRICE: You could be speaking of Summit of the Americas.
QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. Do you have anything to say about the threats or – or if “threats” is the right word – but suggestions that some countries might not show up because the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, and others are not going to be there?
MR PRICE: I don’t have anything to say right now on that. Of course, we will have more to say as the summit gets closer. What – this will be an opportunity for countries throughout the hemisphere to come together to speak to our shared values, the shared interests that unite us. Of course, the White House, as the host of the 9th summit, will determine which countries to invite. The White House has not issued official invites to the summit at this time, but I expect those will go out soon.
QUESTION: Well, when you say “countries throughout the hemisphere,” does that mean all countries, or could some be excluded?
MR PRICE: That is a question that —
QUESTION: Those who do not share your values.
MR PRICE: The invitations are up to the White House, and so we’ll have more to say once invitations are extended.
[]QUESTION: Ned, can I please also ask who will represent Burma on Friday’s special summit? I’m asking because United States sent out an event invitation.
MR PRICE: Sorry, you’re asking because —
QUESTION: Who will represent Burma in the special summit? Because U.S. sent out an invitation.
MR PRICE: We’ll have – and I’m sure you will see more on that in the coming days.
QUESTION: Is Secretary attending in person or in —
MR PRICE: He will. He will. That’s the plan.
[]QUESTION: Going back to the security assistance for Ukraine, the President, of course, is meeting with the Italian prime minister. There’s been concerns expressed in that country, other allies, about the amount of weapons flowing into Ukraine. Does the administration see a limit, especially when it comes to lethal aid?
MR PRICE: We have made clear and the President made clear before the invasion – Secretary Blinken and others have also been speaking to this starting before the invasion but certainly during the invasion – that we would do three things in response to a Russian – renewed Russian invasion against Ukraine. We would provide Ukraine with the security assistance it needs to defend itself, the weapons that it would require to defend Ukrainian freedom, Ukrainian democracy, Ukrainian independence. Second, we would fortify NATO. We would see to it that our Allies, especially our Allies on the eastern flank, had what they needed to deter and potentially even respond to Russian aggression. And third, we made clear that we would put an unprecedented amount of pressure on the Kremlin through financial sanctions, through export control measures, through tools that we would enact with partners and allies around the world.
We have made good on all three of those steps. We will continue to provide Ukraine with what it needs to defend itself. This is about self-defense. It is about preserving what is important to the Ukrainian people and what is in turn important to us, and that is Ukraine’s freedom, its democracy, and its independence.
[]QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Jahanzaib Ali from ARY News TV Pakistan. Secretary Blinken called youngest foreign minister of Pakistan, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, and invited him to attend a food security summit. So what were the points of discussion during the talk? And are we expecting any one-to-one meeting between Secretary Blinken and Bhutto?
MR PRICE: I don’t have any bilateral meetings to preview during the – next week’s food security gathering in New York. What I can say is that Secretary Blinken did have an opportunity to speak with his new Pakistani counterpart, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, last week – May 6th, I believe it was. They had an opportunity to reflect on the 75th anniversary of U.S.-Pakistani relations, to talk about how we can strengthen that cooperation going forward. It is a broad-based bilateral relationship. The Secretary underscored the resolute U.S.-Pakistan commitment to Afghan stability and to combating terrorism as well. They also discussed ongoing engagement when it comes to our economic ties, trade and investment, climate, energy, health, and education. So it was a wide-ranging conversation, as these introductory conversations oftentimes are, and I expect before long they will have an opportunity to follow up on that.
QUESTION: Sir, former Prime Minister Imran Khan is still blaming U.S. efforts from – for his ouster from prime minister office and leading an anti-American campaign. So do you think that his anti-American campaign creating fractures among the structure of the diplomatic relation between Pakistan and U.S. or – or it doesn’t matter?
MR PRICE: We are not going to let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation – lies – get in the way of any bilateral relationship we have, including with the bilateral relationship we have with Pakistan, one we value.
QUESTION: ISI’s chief is here in Washington, D.C. Is there any meeting with Secretary Blinken or any other State Department officials?
MR PRICE: I would refer you to Pakistani authorities to comment on his schedule. I’m not aware of any meeting with Secretary Blinken.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR PRICE: Yes.
[]QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. I have a question about Taiwan. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson criticized the State Department has changed the explanation on Taiwan, wording related to Taiwan on the website. So could you help us understand the significance of changing of the words? And were there any change on legal status of Taiwan or U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act?
MR PRICE: Well, there’s been no change in our policy. All we have done is update a fact sheet, and that’s something that we routinely do with our relationships around the world. When it comes to Taiwan, our policy remains guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques and Six Assurances, as that very fact sheet notes. We regularly do updates on our fact sheets. Our fact sheets reflect, in the case of Taiwan, our rock-solid, unofficial relationship with Taiwan. And we call upon the PRC to behave responsibly and to not manufacture pretenses to increase pressure on Taiwan.
QUESTION: Is it oxymoron to say Taiwan is part of China if the United States has to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979?
MR PRICE: I didn’t catch the first part of your question.
QUESTION: Is it oxymoron to say Taiwan is part of China if the United States had to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979?
MR PRICE: We operate under the auspices of our “one China” policy.
QUESTION: So can I just make sure I understand this?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: So there is absolutely no change in policy towards Taiwan and China based on – so why – why was it updated? Why did it change the language?