(AGENPARL) - Roma, 23 Novembre 2023 - (AGENPARL) – gio 23 novembre 2023 Mercati, infrastrutture, sistemi di pagamento
(Markets, Infrastructures, Payment Systems)
A service architecture for an enhanced
Cyber Threat Intelligence capability and its value for the cyber
resilience of Financial Market Infrastructures
Number
November 2023
by Giuseppe Amato, Simone Ciccarone, Pasquale Digregorio
and Giuseppe Natalucci
Mercati, infrastrutture, sistemi di pagamento
(Markets, Infrastructures, Payment Systems)
A service architecture for an enhanced
Cyber Threat Intelligence capability and its value
for the cyber resilience of Financial Market Infrastructures
by Giuseppe Amato, Simone Ciccarone, Pasquale Digregorio
and Giuseppe Natalucci
Number 43 – November 2023
The papers published in the ‘Markets, Infrastructures, Payment Systems’ series provide
information and analysis on aspects regarding the institutional duties of the Bank of
Italy in relation to the monitoring of financial markets and payment systems and the
development and management of the corresponding infrastructures in order to foster
a better understanding of these issues and stimulate discussion among institutions,
economic actors and citizens.
The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Bank of Italy.
The series is available online at www.bancaditalia.it.
Printed copies can be requested from the Paolo Baffi Library:
Editorial Board: Stefano Siviero, Livio Tornetta, Giuseppe Zingrillo, Guerino Ardizzi,
Paolo Libri, Giuseppe Maresca, Onofrio Panzarino, Tiziana Pietraforte,
Antonio Sparacino.
Secretariat: Alessandra Rollo.
ISSN 2724-6418 (online)
ISSN 2724-640X (print)
Banca d’Italia
Via Nazionale, 91 – 00184 Rome – Italy
Designed and printing by the Printing and Publishing Division of the Bank of Italy
A service architecture for an enhanced
Cyber Threat Intelligence capability and its value for the
cyber resilience of Financial Market Infrastructures
by Giuseppe Amato, Simone Ciccarone, Pasquale Digregorio and Giuseppe Natalucci*
Abstract
In recent years, more and more organizations have been building up or enhancing their own Cyber
Threat Intelligence (CTI) capability. Financial entities need to improve their own cyber resilience
posture to face the ever-expanding range of money-driven or state sponsored threat actors aiming
to undermine the stability of targeted countries by compromising their financial infrastructures.
At the same time, the digital transformation process and steadily growing information sharing
initiatives make a huge amount of data available for CTI analysis. International committees related
to Financial Market Infrastructures (FMI), via commonly agreed policies or directives, and EU
institutions, through normative initiatives, are firmly committed to improving the cybersecurity
posture of FMIs. To this end, one of the main lines of action is to increase information sharing among
financial entities. The large number of heterogeneous information sources and the overwhelming
quantity and variety of available data could have negative impacts on the efficiency of CTI
activities and compromise the effectiveness of defence capabilities. Therefore, the consolidation
and automation of CTI processes must be prioritized in order to improve the effectiveness and
sustainability of CTI operations. However, the definition and automation of CTI processes is still
at a rather immature stage: for example, well-established and vendor-neutral best practices do
not yet exist. The present paper proposes a framework, developed and adopted by the Computer
Emergency Response Team of Banca d’Italia (CERTBI) that integrates a taxonomy and specific
processes to develop an enhanced CTI capability.
JEL Classification: F50, O33, G20, L50, M15.
Keywords: CTI service architecture, CTI service components, information triage, intelligence
case, technical investigation, security orchestration and automation.
Sintesi
Negli ultimi anni un numero sempre maggiore di organizzazioni sta implementando o
potenziando le proprie capacità di Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) per fronteggiare le minacce
cyber. In particolare, le entità finanziarie necessitano di contrastare una sempre più vasta gamma
di threat actors, motivati da interessi economici o statuali, che mirano a indebolire la stabilità
di un paese attraverso la compromissione delle sue infrastrutture finanziare. Allo stesso tempo,
la trasformazione digitale e la crescente diffusione di iniziative volte allo scambio volontario di
informazioni sulle minacce cyber (information sharing) hanno generato un incremento del volume
di dati e informazioni utilizzabili nell’ambito delle attività di CTI. Il miglioramento della postura di
sicurezza cyber delle entità finanziarie, anche grazie a una più intensa condivisione di informazioni
sulle minacce cibernetiche, costituisce un obiettivo primario dei comitati internazionali che
Banca d’Italia, Directorate General for Information Technology, IT Planning Directorate, CERTBI Division. Authors
are listed alphabetically.
regolamentano le infrastrutture dei mercati finanziari (Financial Market Infrastructures, FMIs) ed
è oggetto di specifiche iniziative normative da parte delle istituzioni europee. La numerosità
delle sorgenti informative e la natura eterogenea dei dati da analizzare sono tuttavia fattori critici
che, se non opportunamente gestiti, possono determinare impatti negativi sull’efficienza delle
attività di CTI sino al punto di mettere a rischio l’efficacia delle connesse capacità difensive; è
pertanto necessario adottare processi fortemente automatizzati al fine di aumentarne l’efficacia e
di renderne sostenibile l’onere. Tuttavia, l’area di definizione e automazione dei processi di CTI
appare ancora poco sviluppata, anche a causa della mancanza di best practices consolidate e
indipendenti dalle specifiche soluzioni tecnologiche rese disponibili dai diversi vendor. Il lavoro
propone un framework sviluppato dal Computer Emergency Response Team della Banca d’Italia
(CERTBI) che integra aspetti tassonomici e specifici processi funzionali allo scopo di sviluppare
avanzate capacità di CTI.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Cyber Threat Intelligence capability models
3. The value of an enhanced CTI capability for FMIs
4. The CTI capability development in Banca d’Italia
5. CTI service architecture
5.1 Architecture design
5.2 Entities layer
5.3 Information layer 16
5.4 Service layer
5.5 Service layer components
6. CTI service architecture processes implementation
6.1 Input triage
7. Conclusions and future development
8. References
1. Introduction
Digital transformation is associated with the onset of new cyber threat scenarios, as well as the
constant evolution of cyber-attack techniques and procedures. Cyberspace 1 offers a tremendous
opportunity to achieve political, military, economic and ideological goals to a wide-range of threat
actors (state-sponsored, organized crime and hacktivists). Moreover, both the usage of tradecrafts
available in the wild 2 and the outsourcing of malicious cyber activities 3 significantly increased the
number of adversaries for organizations to face. Despite the global focus on cybersecurity 4 in recent
years, significant improvements are still needed to thwart the continuously evolving cyber-attacks [1]
as also confirmed by a double-digits yearly increase in cybersecurity investment forecast for the coming
years [3].
The banking sector is one among the most affected by significant exposure to cyber threats in terms
of incident costs [3]. In addition, cyber-attacks against Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) can pose
a systemic risk for the financial stability by impairing the provision of critical economic functions and
undermining confidence in the financial system [4]. The interconnectedness of the payment systems,
their wide distribution across multiple countries and the intensive adoption of information technology
are key factors that favour the speed and scale of cyber incident propagation. Moreover, financial sector
represents a highly attractive target for threat actors 5 looking for fast ways to monetize their malicious
activities. Finally, cyber-attacks on FMIs can be performed with the intent of putting pressure on
governments, since those are critical infrastructures to each State.
In this complex and fast evolving context, the adoption of an effective cyber resilience strategy is a
key factor that allows an organization to continue to carry out its mission. It enables the capability of
anticipating and adapting to cyber threats, as well as withstanding, containing and rapidly recovering
from cyber incidents.
In order to achieve these objectives, adequate knowledge and solid understanding of the cyber threat
landscape are crucial. Such needs can be satisfied by developing an appropriate situational awareness,
namely the capability6 of an organization to achieve an understanding of the cyber threat environment
within which it operates, the business implications of being in that environment and the adequacy of its
cyber risk mitigation measures [5]. Situational awareness is a qualifying factor to facilitate decision
making and the adoption of appropriate cyber risk mitigation strategies.
However, cyberspace differs from other domains: physical space and temporal dynamics are among
distinctive factors to consider. First of all, cyberspace involves an enormous amalgamation of individual
networks that provide relatively seamless communication of data [6], therefore threats against a specific
network can be conveyed from anywhere else. Secondly, multiple temporal scales must be considered
simultaneously. Cyber-attacks take place at “computational speed”, i.e. almost instantly, whereas their
traces and effects can only be observed later. For this reason, it is hard to define a “situation” [7] in the
cyberspace domain and a comprehensive situational awareness can be framed primarily through an
effective Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) capability. This document addresses the above topics, firstly
by defining the characteristics of an effective CTI capability, explaining why it contributes to enhance
FMI cyber resilience and describing how Banca d’Italia has empowered its situational awareness in
order to improve its cyber resilience. The second part introduces a framework, designed and adopted by
Cyberspace is the complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software and services on the Internet by means of technology
devices and networks connected to it, which does not exist in any physical form [40].
A tradecraft is a combination of methods, techniques and/or tools to be used in a cyber-attack. It is commonly referred to as being exploited
“in the wild” when it is available through public sources such as websites, blog posts, forums, online cybercriminal databases or other
platforms.
Cybercrime “as a service” (CaaS) is a criminal application of the ‘as-a-service’ business model that offers access to all manner of digital
resources needed to commit cybercrimes, such as malicious software (malware), botnets (networks of computers infected with malware),
hacking specialists, databases of stolen personal information, and other means.
With the term “cybersecurity” it is intended all the activities aiming to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
and/or information systems through the cyber medium. Note that the term “cyber resilience”, used in other parts of the text, has a broader
meaning comprising also the ability of an organization to continue to carry out its mission by anticipating and adapting to cyber threats and
other relevant changes in the environment and by withstanding, containing and rapidly recovering from cyber incidents (definition adapted
from [5]).
A threat actor is an individual, a group or an organization believed to be operating with malicious intent [5].
For the purpose of the document, as “capability” it is intended a combination of skills, resources, processes and systems bringing value to an
organization’s business objective (adapted from [5]).
the Computer Emergency Response Team of Banca d’Italia (CERTBI), to build an enhanced cyber
threat intelligence capability inside Banca d’Italia.
2. Cyber Threat Intelligence capability models
CTI aims at collecting and analysing heterogeneous data, coming from different internal and external
information sources. Its main objective is to provide valuable knowledge to decision makers, also termed
as “actionable intelligence” since it can be acted upon to address, prevent or mitigate a cyber threat. CTI
is carried out by classifying, analysing and enriching collected relevant data and information in order to
identify and assess cyber threats and threat-actor activities, as well as their possible motivations,
capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Such produced intelligence helps an
organization to assign a specific threat profile to its assets and to develop effective counter-actions.
Specifically, cyber threat intelligence can be broken down into three categories: technical/tactical,
operational and strategic [8]. Tactical intelligence is focused on technical elements, and usually it is
provided as Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) 7, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) 8 and
artefacts analysis. This can be used to tune operational defense capabilities, such as firewalls, intrusiondetection devices and response tools. Middle management typically consumes operational intelligence,
that is focused on long-term cyber campaign analysis and TTPs employed by threat actors. Strategic
intelligence provides elements on cyber threats that may affect organization business and, for this
reason, is typically consumed by C-Level management.
A fundamental pillar to the CTI collection capability is information sharing, the process enabling the
volunteer exchange of data and information related to cyber events or incidents among trusted peers or
groups. Information sharing contributes to increased awareness on cyber threats, enhances the capacity
to prevent threats from materializing into real incidents, and enables organizations to better contain the
effects of cyber incidents [9]. This represents a relevant aspect to enhance the cyber resilience of
involved parties, their specific sector and, potentially, the entire ecosystem.
Also for this reason, CTI effectiveness benefits from being performed by a single cyber intelligence
organizational unit, with an intelligence-centric defensive approach. To such an extent, Computer
Emergency Response Teams’ (CERTs) role is crucial in centralizing cyber intelligence expertise,
interacting with other business units and representing a single point of contact to cooperate – on the
basis of mutual recognition and trust – with similar units operating in other organizations, within either
public and private sector 9. In fact, in order to incentivize the cyber threat intelligence exchange,
information sharing takes place within trusted communities that protect the potentially sensitive nature
of the shared information [10].
Recently, a growing number of companies and governmental entities started programs to introduce
an enhanced CTI capability in their own organizations, in order to tackle more effectively the challenges
related to the evolving cyber threat landscape. The need to enhance CTI capability has been already
identified by European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) as a relevant issue for financial entities in order to
improve ability to collect, analyse, consume and share threat intelligence beyond the technical level
[12]. In this scenario, a growing number of organizations with in-house CTI Capability are creating
formal dedicated threat intelligence teams [11] with an increasing trend to seek for specific CTI
professional skills.
Switching from consuming to (also) generating threat intelligence, tailored for the organization, is a
key factor to step up the ability of improving CTI capability. However, the production of environmental7
Indicator of Compromise (IoC) is a digital evidence on a cyber-attack that is identified on organizational systems at host or network level
(adapted from [40]). Indicators of Compromise give valuable information to investigate the event, prepare defenders for future attacks, and
help prevent, detect and respond to similar attacks.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities provided as a list of entries, each containing
a unique identification number, a description, and at least one public reference according to a common enumeration reference model (adapted
from [40]).
CERTs and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) are organizational units that usually provide three categories of services:
reactive services (handle post incident reports from events related to threats or attacks such as compromised hosts, malware, vulnerabilities or
others); proactive services (detect & prevent attacks before their effective impacts on production systems); security quality management
services (review and improve the security posture of their organization). The information sharing and CTI activities fall in the proactive service
category (https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services).
specific threat intelligence can only be effective by including, within the intelligence life cycle, the
internal knowledge coming from intrusion analysis activities, the mastery of the organization’s technical
architectures and a deep understanding of business processes. In such a scenario, it is fundamental to
identify the stakeholders’ needs and translate them into intelligence requirements. These ones can be
defined as any subjects that requires to fill information gaps about cyber threats. On the basis of
intelligence requirements, it is possible to determine the type of threat intelligence to be generated, as
well as its goals.
Furthermore, intelligence production needs to account for fundamental quality metrics [13] and, in
order to be actionable, adhere to the following tenets [14]:
• timeliness – intelligence must be available when leadership requires it. Late intelligence is
as useless as no intelligence. Timely intelligence enables leadership to anticipate events in
the operational area. This enables leadership to time operations for maximum effectiveness
and to avoid being surprised;
• accuracy – to be accurate, intelligence must be objective. It must be free from any political
or other constraint and must not be distorted by pressure to conform with the positions held
by higher levels of command. Intelligence products must not be shaped to conform to any
perceptions of leadership’s preferences. While intelligence is a factor in determining policy,
policy must not determine intelligence;
• usability – intelligence must be tailored to the specific needs of leadership and provided in
forms suitable for immediate comprehension. Leadership must be able to quickly apply
intelligence to the task at hand. Providing useful intelligence requires the producers to
understand the circumstances under which their products are used;
• completeness – complete intelligence answers leadership’s questions about the adversary to
the fullest degree possible. It also tells leadership what remains unknown. To be complete,
intelligence must identify all the adversary’s capabilities. It must inform leadership of the
possible courses of action that are available to the adversary. When justified by the available
evidence, intelligence must forecast future adversary actions and intentions;
• relevance – intelligence must be relevant to the planning and execution of the operation at
hand. It must aid leadership in the accomplishment of the mission. Intelligence must
contribute to leadership’s understanding of the adversary. It must help leadership decide how
to accomplish the assigned mission without being unduly hindered by the adversary.
As an organization decides to enhance its CTI capability to a higher maturity level and produce
actionable intelligence, an improvement in its CTI management is necessary to achieve scalable,
measurable, repeatable and automatable processes. In this scenario, the number of organizations that
establish formal and dedicated cyber threat intelligence teams is growing [11] and consequently there
are significant investments for acquiring specific competences and technology.
However, many organizations are still tailoring their CTI methodology [11], initially inherited from
military and national intelligence sectors [15], to be fitted within their own enterprise cyber resilience
security governance and the specific business context.
The following classification schema [16] can be used by organizations to assess their own CTI
maturity level:
1. Ad-Hoc – some CTI tasks are initiated, but the activities are not yet organized and
coordinated;
2. Defined – the business processes specific to CTI have been formalized and are running
repeatedly;
3. Aligned – the CTI activities are starting to be integrated with the organization’s processes;
4. Controlled – CTI activities are measured and correspondingly adapted to meet desired goals;
5. Optimizing – CTI processes are systematically analysed and improvements to maximize the
outcomes are selected;
6. Innovating – new CTI methods and tooling are developed and deployed beyond the state of
the art.
Numerous CTI organizations are currently reaching different levels of maturity through the
implementation of technical capabilities and specific processes [2].
CTI tools have been evolving from rudimentary toolkits to highly advanced platforms, which provide
semi-automated workflows to manage huge volumes of data and information from multiple open and
closed sources. However, the modern ecosystem leveraged by threat actors is settling into a new level
of business automation too: an example could be the cybercrime value-chain adoption of the “as-aservice” model. This scenario highlights the need to strike the unbalance between attackers and
defenders, overcoming the defenders’ lack in dedicated processes and automation, which is considered
among the major blocking factors to CTI effectiveness [15].
Well-defined and automatable processes represent a key factor to free up resources for the highly
complex CTI tasks. Most of the CTI units with not well-defined processes appear struggling in the CTI
automation area as a consequence of the relatively young age of commercial threat intelligence and the
lack of a standard process [2] – [17].
The next step, in order to face increased complexity, is to refine and consolidate the practices [18].
The long-term goal is to run standard CTI processes, which could be beneficial for all organizations
both in terms of cost reduction – e.g. enabling the usage of standard orchestration tools – and better
interoperability. A further implicit benefit is the levelling of CTI teams’ capabilities towards a standard
reference, which enhances the effectiveness of collaboration and information sharing.
Advanced technical capabilities, defined processes and automation represent invaluable factors to
build an enhanced CTI capability, a pivotal element to reach at least an optimizing level of CTI maturity
and to produce cyber intelligence tailored for fulfilling specific organization needs.
Although building an adequate CTI capability has become a well-known need, reference best
practices don’t exist. In this respect, some models focus on the definition of common CTI concepts,
principles and taxonomy [19] or define basic building blocks of generic CTI infrastructure [20]. Recent
ones propose elements to address CTI information sharing [21].
CTI-like capabilities are often included in other security management processes, such as
incident/information risk management, but usually with limited scope. Many open source and
commercial threat intelligence platforms actually integrate a form of intelligence cases’ management
capability, that is typically customised in proprietary and different ways by each platform [22]- [23].
Most of the issues related to the structuring a CTI high-level operational models, as practical and
effective processes, are yet to be resolved [17]. Moreover, a reference standard model for inter-/intraorganization effective collaboration is still to be defined, as well as a common threat management
workflow [2]- [22]. Furthermore, several examples of CTI infrastructure models and requirements [8]
are available, although there is a demand for a common detailed definition of the related operational
model and workflows.
A recent survey on the level of adoption of CTI [11], which has involved about 200 respondent
organizations, half of them belonging to Banking and Finance or Government sector, revealed a relevant
part of them is striving to develop an adequate CTI capability. The survey also highlighted a low usage
of advanced tools, like CTI platforms, that could improve effectiveness of collecting information and
disseminating intelligence. Finally, it points up the need of integrating CTI processes and tools.
3. The value of an enhanced CTI capability for FMIs
Organizations providing essential services are among those that can have the interest and resources
to invest in establishing an enhanced CTI capability. Specifically, the systemic relevance of national
critical infrastructures requires particular entities, identified as Digital Service Providers 10 and
Operators of Essential Services 11 according to the EU Directive “Network and Information Security”
(NIS, recently replaced by NIS2) to increase their cyber resilience posture. In this context, CTI helps to
identify the major threat scenarios [24] and to prioritize the proper countermeasures. CTI provides the
possibility to select and prioritize the analysis of data subset that can actually affect an organization (e.g.
related to specific threat actors).
A “digital service” is defined by the Directive (EU) 2015/1535 as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by
electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services”. Nonetheless, in the context of the NIS, DSPs are limited to only three
types of services: cloud, online marketplaces and search engines.
Operators of Essential Services are public or private entities providing services “essential to the maintenance of critical societal and/or
economic activities”. The following are sectors involved: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, health, drinking water
supply and distribution, digital infrastructures.
Regarding the FMIs, a use case is represented by the early detection of external threats, useful to
implement appropriate preventive controls and prepare an effective response. Specifically, a common
signal of imminent cyber-threat is the presence of fake or compromised digital resources related to
financial institutions (e.g. fake bank websites and social media profiles, stolen credit cards, mobile
banking access credentials, etc.). It is a growing phenomenon associated to both financial fraud
preparation and sophisticated state-sponsored campaigns against financial services or institutions. An
enhanced CTI capability should be able to focus on the FMI related resources and promptly trigger the
best counteractions in order to prevent the threat to realize (e.g. taking down the fictitious website,
interdicting network access and providing advices to victims, involved financial entities and responsible
security teams).
CTI is also pervasively used to provide up-to-date cyber threat scenarios that address threat led
penetration testing, a controlled attempt to compromise the cyber resilience of an entity by simulating
the tactics, techniques and procedures of real-life threat actors [25]. Currently, mimicking an adversary
behavior is one of the most valuable ways to verify cyber resilience posture. The test effectiveness
thereby is directly correlated to the CTI capability to build an accurate profile of the malicious actors
threatening financial entities. For example, in order to build an effective ransomware attack test
scenario, CTI allows to provide knowledge about techniques leveraged by threat actor against the
financial entities.
Moreover, CTI enables the design of effective security awareness campaigns based on current cyber
threat evolution. As malicious actors evolve their techniques to swindle people, an advanced CTI
capability should trigger and keep up ad-hoc security awareness programs to educate potential victims
as soon as possible. For example, the financial sector has seen a growing trend in sophisticated scam
techniques where threat actors have successfully used a combination of social engineering methods via
emails, phone calls and IT systems vulnerabilities in order to illicitly operate on victims’ banking
accounts.
An advanced CTI capability in FMI shall therefore support a plethora of complex IT and
organizational security needs.
In that regard, financial authorities recommend CTI capability enhancement being part of the cyber
resilience strategy.
Namely, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) [26] indicate CTI as a key factor to drive the
overarching components of a cyber resilience strategy. According to this principle, the European Central
Bank (ECB), with the publication of the Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations (CROE) [5], drives
FMIs to set up their objectives based on the level of expectation they want to achieve (evolving,
advancing or innovating). The CROE outlines five primary risk management categories12 and three
overarching components 13 that should be addressed across an FMI’s cyber resilience framework (see
Figure 1).
The risk management categories are (i) governance, (ii) identification, (iii) protection, (iv) detection, and (v) response and recovery.
(i) Governance refers to the arrangements an FMI has put in place to establish, implement and review its approach to managing cyber risks.
(ii) Identification is the capability of an FMI to identify which of their operations and supporting information assets should, in order of priority,
be protected against compromise (iii) Protection consists of effective security controls and system and process design that protect the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an FMI’s assets and services. These measures should be proportionate to an FMI’s threat landscape
and systemic role in the financial system, and consistent with its risk tolerance. (iv) Detection is an FMI’s ability to recognize signs of a
potential cyber incident or detect that an actual breach has taken place. (v) Response and recovery are the FMI’s arrangements enabling the
resume of critical operations rapidly, safely and with accurate data in order to mitigate the potential systemic risks of failure and meet
obligations.
The overarching components are the transversal elements of FMI’s cyber resilience framework that should address such expectations. They
are (i) testing, situational (ii) awareness, and (iii) learning and evolving.
Identification
Recovery
Governance
Detection
Protection
Figure 1: CROE risk categories and overarching components
In this context, cyber threat intelligence is mostly essential to address the situational awareness,
namely the overarching component concerning the FMI capability to understand the surrounding cyber
threat environment, the implications on its business and the adequacy of its cyber risk mitigation
measures. Situational awareness can significantly advance FMI’s ability to pre-empt cyber events or to
respond quickly and effectively to them. Moreover, it enables an FMI to validate its cyber resilience
overall strategy and its effective implementation. Finally, building an enhanced CTI capability is a key
factor to achieve and sustain the CROE requisites for the innovating level 14. It is also worth mentioning
the pivotal role that cyber threat intelligence plays in the security testing frameworks developed by the
Bank of England (CBEST [20]) and by ECB (TIBER-EU [27]).
European Bank Authority (EBA), for its part, recommends the adoption of CTI to face the latest
cyber threats and vulnerabilities and ensure business continuity [19].
Ultimately, the role CTI plays in the cyber resilience strategy is well known nowadays, in particular
among FMIs. Indeed, Authorities set expectations on cyber threat intelligence capabilities of financial
entities in order to strengthen the cyber resilience of the entity itself and the sector as a whole, also
fostering the active participation in information sharing arrangements and collaboration with trusted
stakeholders.
A noticeable example in the financial sector is the European Cyber Resilience Board Cyber
Information and Intelligence Sharing Initiative (ECRB CIISI-EU) 15, a multilateral cyber information
and intelligence sharing initiative bringing together a community of public and private financial
organizations.
sources of intelligence, correlated log analysis, alerts, traffic flows, cyber events across other sectors and geopolitical events to better
understand the evolving threat landscape and proactively take the appropriate measures to improve its cyber resilience capabilities.
CIISI-EU was launched by the European Cyber Resilience Board (ECRB) for pan-European Financial Infrastructures, aiming to: raise cyber
resilience awareness, catalyze joint initiatives, provide a place to share best practices and foster trust and collaboration. The CIISI community
currently includes European financial infrastructures, central banks, critical service providers, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
(ENISA) and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation.
Incentivizing the exchange of cyber threat information is also recommended by the Digital
Operational Resilience Act (DORA)16, an EU Regulation where the improvement of
information sharing is among the key factors to prevent cyber-attacks and reduce ICT threats to the
financial system as a whole [10]. However, DORA does not recommend the adoption of any specific
technological solution or process.
In this regard, the European Systemic Risk Board, as a primary step developing a pan-European
systemic cyber incident coordination framework, recommends defining standard communication
channels among financial authorities [4].
On the other hand, although authorities have defined requirements to fulfil, well-recognized
reference frameworks and best practices are still lacking. Consequently, the level of CTI capability
among FMI entities appear still jeopardized [11] while the ability to produce and consume high-quality
and well-contextualized intelligence is fundamental to get the best benefit for the financial sector cyber
resilience. The possibility to leverage on a shared model should be an enabling factor to achieve the
goal: in particular, a common way of working organized into processes, structural capabilities and
implementable operational tasks can facilitate the information sharing process.
4. The CTI capability development in Banca d’Italia
In order to face the rapid evolution of cyber threats and their continual rise in sophistication, Banca
d’Italia has chosen to equip itself with an autonomous CTI capability and has promoted information
sharing activities and collaborations with national and supranational qualified parties. So in 2017, the
institutional CERT (CERTBI) was established, in line with the 2017-2019 strategic plan 17, with the
ultimate goal of concentrating in a single organizational unit all competencies needed to enable an
effective production and to share information and intelligence on cyber threats with external
counterparts. These activities complement IT security services provided by other units, increasing the
Institution’s preparedness to face cyber-attacks.
Currently, CERTBI carries out cyber intelligence activities for proactively countering cyber threats,
producing actionable intelligence and disseminating it, in a timely and effective manner, to
the Institute’s internal and external stakeholders. As regards the activities to safeguard Banca d’Italia
systems and services, it serves as institutional contact point for cooperation and cyber-threat
information sharing initiatives with external qualified counterparts at national, EU and extra-EU levels,
to face cyber threats according to the collective defense principle 18. Moreover, CERTBI regularly takes
part in cyber incident response exercises organized at national and international level to further
strengthen collaboration with public and private sector counterparties. Finally, it promotes initiatives to
increase its constituency 19 security awareness, encouraging proper behaviors to prevent cyber incidents.
CERTBI has developed its own competencies to gain knowledge about cyber threat landscape and
to provide situational awareness to various stakeholders, involved in the decision-making process at
strategic, operational and tactical level, contributing towards increasing the Banca d’Italia digital
operational resilience. To achieve this goal the following enabling-capabilities have been consolidated
(see Figure 2):
• Cooperation across national and supranational institutions: the active involvement in a
participatory security model realized by a joint collaboration on common cybersecurity
issues. As main advantage, it allows leveraging on different competencies and knowledge
basis and scale-up the Banca d’Italia capability to enhance its cyber resilience together with
the inter-connected cyber ecosystem it relies on.
• Information Sharing: a constant exchanging of cyber-threat information with a growing
number of high-qualified counterparts including both FMI entities and national institutions.
DORA creates a regulatory framework on digital operational resilience whereby all firms need to make sure they can withstand, respond to
and recover from all types of ICT-related disruptions and threats [41].
https://www.bancaditalia.it/chi-siamo/organizzazione/Strategic-Plan-for-2017-2019.pdf?language_id=1
Collective defense uses information sharing and cooperation among defenders to counteract and rebalance the asymmetry that exists between
cyber threats and an individual organization. In this way, the detection capability of one entity can improve the defense measures of another
Constituency: represents users that need to consume intelligence at strategic, operational or tactical level, including C-level executives,
Corporate Security and Risk Management and -on need basis- specific Business Units. Security Operations are also included.
The extensive collection of information supports CERT ability to analyze the cyber threat
landscape, timely produce actionable intelligence and provide it to the stakeholders.
Cyber Threat Intelligence: the foundational capability to produce autonomously Cyber
Threat Intelligence at technical, tactical, operational and strategic level in the context of an
intelligence-led-cybersecurity paradigm.
Cyberspace Monitoring: a continuous and proactive scrutiny of cyberspace looking after
data and information related to potential threats. This activity enables the CERT capability
to identify and trigger the execution of pre-emptive defense actions.
Figure 2: Situational Awareness and its enabling capabilities
To carry out its mission, CERTBI has embraced the “intelligence-driven” paradigm, with the
objective to increase and consolidate its cyber intelligence capability.
In line with this objective, as people are the fundamental key asset, CTI team members are fostering to
develop their expertise through highly specialized and professional training. Moreover, Banca d’Italia
has launched a dedicated public competition in order to undertake the nowadays challenge to recruit
high-profile cyber threat intelligence professionals.
Processes and technology are further fundamental components as they enable the collection and
processing of a huge amount of data from heterogeneous sources, the correlation and the analysis of
information and ultimately the production and dissemination of deliverables that effectively transfer
knowledge to the intended recipients. To meet these requirements, CERTBI has developed its CTI
service architecture and a set of integrated processes able to boost tasks standardization and automation:
they have driven the setup of a technological solution for the security orchestration and automation
capable of ensuring a high level of activities management and control, as well as achieving the
introduction of advanced logics of automation inside CTI processes.
5. CTI service architecture
The approach used in this work to model CTI capability is inspired by the principles of ServiceOriented Architecture (SOA) methodology. It provides a set of guidelines and techniques in which
business processes, information and enterprise assets can be effectively (re-)organized and
(re-)deployed, to support and enable strategic plans and productivity levels that are required within
competitive business environments [28].
As a driving principle, a business process can be broken down into a manageable hierarchy of finegrained independent services, interacting together according to a customizable choreography. Each
service can be implemented by a different application component as long as it keeps the same service
interfaces and respect a set of general architecture constraints. These properties enable the possibilities
to use heterogeneous technologies, be able to replace one or more component without impacting the
entire system and even re-use them in a different combination/choreography to realize another system.
The combination of flexibility and high methodology maturity have been deemed strategic elements of
choice for the support of a fast evolving activity like the CTI.
The underpinning concept that drives the design of a CTI service architecture is the identification
and the modelling of all parties that can exchange data, information and intelligence. In other words,
consumers of intelligence produced by the service, as well as other entities that collaborate to reach the
goal, need to be defined. Operating under this assumption, boundaries between the service and its
environment can be drawn, showing the entities and their interactions with it.
The first entity is the organization where the service is run, whose needs are to be satisfied. In
addition, to accomplish its goals, the service exchanges data and information with external counterparts
and deals with commercial CTI providers. Figure 3 shows the identified entities and their involved
interactions.
Organization
Data and information requests
Intelligence products
Requests to perform tasks
Data and Information
Information requests
Responses to tasks
Data and Information
Intelligence products
Information requests
Data and Information
Intelligence products
CTI service
External
Counterparts
Data and Information
Intelligence products
Information requests
Commercial
CTI Providers
Information requests
Figure 3: CTI service context diagram
In detail, the “data and information” flow depicted in above figure represent the exchange of raw
data not yet fully analysed by CTI experts. “Intelligence products” are instead the outcome of analysis
performed by the CTI service and tailored to the needs of the receiver at tactical, operational or
strategical level. The “information requests” regards a specific information required to complete an
intelligence investigations or needed by the organization in order to take informed actions. The “requests
to perform tasks” typically identifies activities to be performed to fill an information gap.
5.1 Architecture design
The proposed service architecture is developed to cope with all phases of the intelligence life cycle
(planning, collection, processing, analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence) [29]. As per
Figure 3, it is made up of three layers: Entities layer, Information layer and Service layer. In each layer,
three specific kinds of components are located: Entity, Information and Capability.
5.2 Entities layer
This layer includes all those parties that can provide/receive data, information and knowledge
to/from the CTI service: Constituency, External Counterparts and Commercial CTI Providers.
Constituency represents the part of an organization that need to consume intelligence at strategic,
operational or tactical level, including C-level executives, Corporate Security and Risk Management, as
well as – depending on the organization structure – more specific Business Units. Security and
Operational units are included among them as well. Indeed, they are, at the same time, part of the
constituency as primary consumer of tactical threat intelligence and the organisational unit aimed to
produce a specific input (Alert) ingested by the service and to perform specific tasks in response to CTI
service indications. Finally, the Constituency may proactively, or upon request, provide data and
information to the CTI Service to accomplish its own goals.
External Counterparts are all the external organizations that are allowed to interact with the CTI
service, in line with established agreements. Information sharing takes place with these entities. External
counterparts can be summarized as follow:
peers — organizations with whom one-to-one agreements are in place;
national institutions, bodies and agencies — they represent domestic institutions, bodies
and agencies (involved in law enforcement, defense and intelligence activities) that can
provide CTI deliverables. This interaction is based on national information sharing agreement
as well as on protocols to be followed in case of a national-scale cyber incident;
foreign and supranational institutions, bodies and agencies — they can provide CTI
deliverables representing non-national and non-commercial organizations which cooperation
agreements are established with;
sharing communities — they include formal/informal, sector/inter-sectorial, public/private
groups aimed to share cyber threat data and information on a voluntary basis [30].
Vendors provide commercial CTI services, producing deliverables and fulfilling on-demand
intelligence needs through “information requests”. Other than human-readable, they also provide
Machine-Readable Threat Intelligence (MRTI) [31], that is a continuous flow of technical data (feeds),
delivered in a structured notation, that can be (semi-)automatically ingested and processed by security
tools and systems.
5.3 Information layer
The Information layer includes all the data, information and intelligence products that the CTI
Service handles, as either input or output, towards entities: alerts, Request for Information (RFI) and
deliverables.
An alert is raised when there is a piece of evidence related to a running or potential threat for the
Constituency: it usually comes from the Security Operations Center (SOC), or it can be produced
autonomously by a component of the CTI service.
A RFI is created when an information gap needs to be filled. Constituency or External Counterparts,
as well as intelligence team members, may submit RFIs to generate intelligence collection efforts. RFIs
are specific, time-sensitive, and not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled
intelligence production (intelligence requirements). They may be either an input from Entities
(Constituency or External Counterparts) or an output sent to them to enable CTI service to build
intelligence regarding current or potential threats.
A deliverable is the CTI product used to effectively transfer information or knowledge related to one
or more cyber threats. It can be either the output of the CTI service delivered to the Entities, or an input
from them used by the CTI service to accomplish its goals. Deliverables can be disseminated either
when pre-established conditions happen (periodically or triggered by specific events), or in reply to an
RFI. On the basis of the expected consumer, the category of the intelligence to be transferred and its
timing requirements, the following deliverables’ taxonomy is developed within this layer (main targets
of deliverables are shown in parentheses):
Security Alert — warning on imminent or ongoing cyber threats and associated short-term
recommendations for prevention and/or mitigation (Constituency);
Security Advisory — recommendation concerning preventive defense actions
or workaround related to new relevant vulnerabilities or TTPs (Security and Operational
staff);
Flash Report — information regarding an imminent or ongoing threat to disseminate
promptly to stakeholders in order to led them take effective decisions (internal/external
decision makers);
Threat Bulletin — analysis focused on a specific cyber event or cyber threat
(internal/external decision makers);
Operational CTI Report — operational periodic update about cyber threat landscape
(Security and Operational managers);
Strategic CTI Report — strategic periodic update about cyber threat landscape, with analysis
of recent relevant cyber events and predictions (C-level executives).
5.4 Service layer
This layer includes all the capabilities of the CTI service (see Figure 4).
• Input Interface — the entry point for the incoming flows. It validates the source and
categorizes the content of the input before invoking the appropriate process handling such
input. In the same way, outgoing flows have a single exit point, the Output Interface
component that triggers either the information delivery or the issuance of requests.
• Internal CTI Production — the production source for information and intelligence. It may
require the Constituency to perform additional tasks, in order to fill information gaps at tactical
and operational levels, through the Reactive CTI Collection component.
• Proactive CTI Collection — it monitors the cyberspace looking after data and information
related to threats that could potentially affect the Constituency.
• CTI Service Management — it includes several structural capabilities needed to manage the
service and its internal knowledge base, activities and resources.
Figure 4: Service architecture
5.5 Service layer components
Service layer components are containers used to group homogeneous entities such as structural
capabilities (consisting of activities that run continuously, independently from the service inputs),
processes or tasks for specific operational units.
Interaction between different components can be two-fold: by information flows and by operational
flows. Information flows carry any element included in the Information layer. Operational flows are
instead a command path leading to capability or process invocation. Service layer components are
shown in Figure 5 and described below.
The Input interface is composed of the Input Triage and the Incoming RFI handling processes. The
Input Triage process, described in detail in the following paragraph, analyses incoming deliverables,
alerts and RFIs, in order to prioritize them and provide the information needed to determine resulting
actions. In case of deliverables and alerts, a decision is required to either send them directly towards the
output interface or trigger the Internal CTI Production component.
Input RFIs, instead, are preliminarily checked and routed to the devoted Incoming RFI handling
process, where the opportunity to reply to the request – with a given priority – or provide a feedback to
the requestor, is evaluated. When the decision to reply is taken, the process triggers the internal CTI
production component in order to create the needed knowledge.
The Output interface relies on the Information To Share/Request process to evaluate information
to be shared or requested to Entities: this is performed by mapping the content to the intended recipients
and identifying the right procedures to send/request the information (i.e. selecting which communication
channels, sharing/re-sharing capabilities and classification/confidentiality levels are to be adopted with
third parties).
The Internal CTI Production component contains the core CTI operational processes: Technical
Investigation handling and Intelligence Case handling.
A Technical Investigation provides technical/tactical information deliverables by analysing a threat
among the internal and external perimeters, or by setting up a specific investigation environment. A
technical investigator can escalate and, if needed, ask for an Intelligence Case to be opened.
An Intelligence Case analyses a potential or running cyber threat in order to determine the
appropriate defensive or preventative actions and strategies against the threat. The Intelligence Case can
be used to build knowledge in order to reduce the uncertainty about relevant cyberspace phenomena.
Each Intelligence Case is assigned to a case officer who is responsible for the overall activities’
coordination and interactions towards case resolution. If needed, an Intelligence Case can trigger one or
several Technical Investigations.
Reactive CTI Collection is used by Internal CTI Production to dispatch requests to Operations teams
within the organization: Technical Investigation process can initiate a request to perform task to either
Security Operations or IT Operations. Intelligence Case process can start tasks to be dispatched to Cyber
Intelligence Operations, which performs active research and collection of information (in or through the
cyberspace), when specific knowledge on threat actors tactics and procedures are needed.
Proactive CTI Collection is composed by Digital Footprint Monitoring and News/Media Monitoring,
which routinely scan the cyberspace searching for, respectively, CTI data/information and news/media
sources related to potential threats affecting the Constituency.
Constituency
External Counterparts
Alert
Commercial CTI Providers
Deliverable
Share
Input Interface
Output interface
Info To Share/
Request
Input Triage
Internal CTI Production
Incoming RFI
Management
Handling
Technical
Investigation
Handling
Proactive CTI
collection
Digital Footprint
Monitoring
News/Media
Monitoring
Request
Intelligence
Case Handling
Reactive CTI collection
Task for Cyber
Intelligence
Operations Teams
CTI Service Management
Capability Framework
Management
Trend/Scenario
Analysis Management
Structural
Capability
Threat Model and Threat
Profiling Management
Knowledge
Management
Information Source
Management
Task for Security
Operations Teams
Task for IT
Operations Teams
Information Flow
Process
Operational Flow
Figure 5: Service layer components
Finally, the CTI management is made up of the followings sub-components:
Knowledge Management, which handles data, information, knowledge and intelligence
collected as part of the CTI service, and includes a repository to store and retrieve them;
Information Source Management, which handles the relationship with Entities and manages
an information source repository containing attributes on such entities (reliability score,
agreements and obligations, allowed and expected information, etc.);
Capability Framework Management, which is responsible for the CTI service architecture’s
review and maintenance, as well as the provisioning and allocation of resources required to
enact processes and to accomplish set goals;
Trend/Scenario Analysis Management, which leverages on the Knowledge Management
repository to perform descriptive and predictive analysis on potential or imminent threats;
Threat Model and Threat Profiling Management, which produces and maintains the
organization’s threat models and threat actors’ profiles.
6. CTI service architecture processes implementation
The model described above, in line with SOA business processes decomposition principle, defines
all the elements of the CTI service architecture and its main operational and information flows. In the
subsequent steps, the model is translated in an actual operational service framework. In particular, the
implementation of the model pivots around the transformation of the five CTI processes to executable
workflows which coordinate the CTI team activities integrated with CTI structural capabilities and
ancillary tasks execution in order to consume, produce and disseminate data and intelligence. The
implementation keeps a high degree of technology agnosticism, allowing for reusability in other
contexts. It aligns with the common requirement for organizations with a higher CTI maturity level to
provide a formal, holistic, transparent and repeatable process [32].
Among the five implemented CTI processes, the following paragraph aims to provide more details about
the implementation of the Input Triage, which is the primary beneficiary of the enhanced workflow
definition and automation. This process is executed for all data and information fed into CTI services
from various threat intelligence sources, including internal, external, counterpart, or commercial
sources.
6.1 Input triage
This process must balance the need to empower the information collection capabilities with the
available information processing resources by filtering, prioritizing and validating relevant information
for the protection of the Constituency.
Input information has to be assessed, at first, in terms of source identification and input data
compliance. Afterwards, qualitative and quantitative evaluations are performed to define the
information relevancy and to calculate a priority score (i.e. valorisation phase). Nevertheless, alerts from
Security Operations can be considered as pre-validated inputs and thus are immediately forwarded to
the valorisation phase.
As shown in Figure 6, the Input Triage process starts (1) with the source identification and the input
data compliance checks in terms of source authorization, reliability score, predefined agreements, used
communication channels, expected information type and format.
During the following step, information is dissected. If the input includes a RFI, the Incoming RFI
Management process is invoked: (2.a) input is evaluated, classified, and eventually replied, depending
on the evaluation outcomes. Incoming RFI Management triggers further processes aimed at producing
the requested information with format and timing pre-agreed with the sender. On the other hand, if the
input is a piece of information, it is stored in the knowledge repository (2.b), and it is evaluated against
its relevancy (3). Finally, in case of Alert, the input is automatically considered as relevant and it is sent
directly to step (4).
Input triage
Check source
compliance
Is the source
compliant ?
Input from source
Information
source
repository
Dissect input
content
What is the
content?
Deliverable
Alert
Collect raw
information
Reject sender
input
Knowledge
management
repository
Evaluate
relevancy
Is the
information
relevant?
No further
actions needed
Request or dissemination
needed
Trigger action
Incoming RFI
management
Technical investigation needed
Info To
Share/Request
Technical
Investigation
Perform
valorization
Information scoring
frameworks
Opening an intelligence case needed
Intelligence
Figure 6: Input triage
A piece of information is considered as “relevant” when it satisfies one or more collection
intelligence requirements. They can be identified by considering the available threat model and by
evaluating the potential threat’s proximity to Constituency, referred to as Threat Proximity (TP). This
indicator measures the distance between the entities impacted or potentially affected by the event and
the Constituency. As a precondition, custom metrics need to be defined: they can be based, for example,
on criteria related to the involved business sectors, the geographical location and the level of connection
with the organization’s supply chain.
Relevant information is then valorised (4) by the use of multiple scoring frameworks, with the
purpose of determining the most appropriate handling. More in detail, at this step, information stored in
the Knowledge Management repository is enriched with the vector {AS, TS, PS} defined below:
Admiralty Score (AS) – based on Admiralty Code, the score represents the confidence level
applicable to the information [32] [33]. Specifically, it measures the input information
credibility and the information source reliability. The Code prompts the requestor to rate each
piece of evidence according to:
a. the expected source reliability in providing accurate information on this occasion, rated
from “A” to “F”. The judgment is primarily based on the source type and reputation, e.g.
the highest “A” rating may label trusted private- or public-sector entities; the intermediate
“C2 rating may label news published by proper respectable medium; the lowest “F” rating
may label a brand new, not yet assessed source. The other rating factor is the level of
competence attributed to the source: a specialized cyber threat intelligence center is likely
more reliable than a generic administration department.
b. the validity likelihood of the claim, rated from 1 to 6. The rating accounts for how the claim
compares with other verified evidence (e.g. whether it contradicts the evidence or not), and
how well it fits with existing theories/explanations (e.g. whether it is consistent with
international regulations or it can be actually feasible within a given context and timeframe).
Reliability
of the source
Validity likelihood
of the claim
Completely reliable
Completely credible
Usually reliable
Probably true
Fairly reliable
Possibly true
Not usual reliable
Doubtful
Unreliable
Improbable
Reliability cannot be judged
Truth cannot be judged
Table 1: Admiralty Score-values scale definition
For a more convenient usage, Admiralty Score (AS) can be mapped to a unique credibility
indicator, the Confidence Range (CR), adapting specific criteria [33]. With this method,
from AS scores is possible to derive a scale of CR values with the level of granularity
deemed most appropriate for the organization needs. For the purpose of the document, it is
reported a simplified mapping example where the confidence range span among three
values: “0: Not Credible”; “0,5: Uncertain/to further investigate”; “1: Credible”.
SOURCE RELIABILITY
VALIDITY
LIKELIHOOD
A1 B1
C1 D1 E1 F1
A2 B2
C2 D2 E2 F2
A3 B3
C3 D3 E3 F3
A4 B4
C4 D4 E4 F4
A5 B5
C5 D5 E5 F5
A6 B6
C6 D6 E6 F6
CONFIDENCE RANGE
1: Credible
0.5: Uncertain/
to further investigate
0: Not credible
Table 2: Mapping Admiralty Score to the Confidence Range
Threat Score (TS) – the indicator measures the danger of the threat. Its calculation takes in
account the Confidence Range and the Threat Level.
The Threat Level (TL) is a score resulting by the combination of threat actor offensive
capability (e.g. level of its financial and people resources), its hostile intent (e.g. geopolitical or financial gain interests) and attack opportunities against the target (e.g. possible
vulnerability to leverage on). For example, in the context of financial services, an elevated
threat level may be assigned to a threat actor that is: i) categorized as state-sponsored, i.e.
it can count on vast resources provided by the sponsoring state (high offensive capability);
ii) historically targeting financial entities for political or economic reasons (clear hostile
intent); iii) able to leverage software vulnerabilities (relevant attack opportunities). The
value of Threat Level can be calculated adopting various criteria: for the purpose of this
document, an example is shown in the Table 3:
Threat level
High (1)
Description
Sophisticated targeted attack
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Unsophisticated targeted attack
Non-targeted attack
Table 3: Threat levels example
The value of Threat Score can be calculated adopting various criteria: for the purpose of
this document, an example is shown in the Table 4:
THREAT
LEVEL
CONFIDENCE RANGE
Credible
Uncertain
Not credible
Medium
THREAT
SCORE
Table 4: Threat Score
Priority Score (PS) – it is the synthetical indicator, calculated on the basis of Threat Score
and Threat Proximity, that can be used to prioritize the information to manage and the cyber
threat prevention or mitigation initiatives.
Threat Proximity (TP) measures the potential threat target’s proximity to the
Constituency on the basis of selected parameters characterizing the organization business
and IT assets. TP common evaluation parameters are the potential geographical, political,
economic, interdependencies the organization has with the threatened entities, e.g. in
relation to its supply-chain. As example, a simplified TP proximity scale is reported in the
following table:
Threat
Description
Proximity
Constituency
Organization partners or suppliers
Organization in the same sector or with other specific interdependencies
Others
Table 5: Threat Proximity Scale
Threat
Score
Priority Score can either be calculated by a mathematical formula or by a complex mapping
functions, possibly considering organization-specific adjustment parameters to tune it
against false positives. For the purpose of the document, a simplified example of PS
calculation is reported in the Table 6.
Threat
Proximity
1 2 3 4
Priority Score
Medium
Table 6: Priority Score identification matrix
Finally, the information confidentiality is classified according to national law, internal policies and
the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) [34]. Once the information is dissected, analysed, valorised and
classified, the appropriate process (5.a, 5.b or 5.c) is triggered:
(5.a) Invocation of the Info To Share/Request process to share the received information with
Constituency and/or External Counterparts, when appropriate (e.g. for detecting and
preventing the threat described in the information) or to demand more data, information or
intelligence (RFI) from Entities. In detail: a) check for unwanted disclosures in the
submitting deliverable, alert or RFI; b) package in the appropriate format the sanitized
deliverable, alert or RFI to deliver them to the intended recipients; c) redirect any feedback
received by the recipients to the appropriate service components.
(5.b) Start of a Technical Investigation, to provide tactical information deliverable by analysing
a threat among the internal and/or external perimeter, or by setting a specific investigation
environment up.
(5.c) Open an Intelligence Case, to analyse a potential or current cyber threat in order to determine
the appropriate defensive or preventative counter-actions and strategies. The Intelligence
Case may also be used to build knowledge in order to reduce uncertainty about relevant
cyberspace phenomena.
7. Conclusions and future development
An enhanced CTI capability represents a game changer for FMIs to empower the effectiveness of
their own cyber defense, but it also increases the complexity of their cybersecurity operations’
management.
Furthermore, the demand for an overarching service architecture and well-defined common
processes is becoming increasingly relevant as more public and private entities improve their CTI
capabilities and collaborate to face cyber-attacks that are constantly evolving and becoming increasingly
more sophisticated, widespread and undetected.
In recent years, financial authorities and regulation entities have promoted many initiatives to
enhance the cyber resilience of the financial ecosystem.
Notably, the development of an advanced CTI capability is a key element required by CROE in order
to achieve a higher level of expectations (the “innovating” level) in the area of threat prevention and
proactive defense against cyber-attacks.
However, even though the widespread awareness about the main role CTI plays in the cyber
resilience of the entire financial sector, there is a lack of processes and methodologies capable to support
the development of an enhanced CTI capability.
Furthermore, insufficient information sharing and cooperation on cyber threat intelligence at the
strategical, operational and tactical level prevent organizations from adequately assessing, monitoring,
defending against and responding to cyber threats.
In order to address those needs, a vendor-agnostic service model, not affected by any technical bias,
is proposed. Specifically, this document describes, omitting sensitive details, the CTI service
architecture that currently supports cyber threat intelligence activities carried out by Computer
Emergency Response Team of Banca d’Italia (CERTBI). Its adoption has enhanced the autonomous
CTI capability of the Institute and has empowered its cyber situational awareness. As main benefit,
CERTBI has increased its effectiveness in providing situational awareness to the decision-makers at
strategic, operational and tactical levels, contributing towards the enhancement of the Banca d’Italia
cybersecurity posture and digital operational resilience.
The service architecture has been designed using a top-down approach, defining specific processes,
structural capabilities and operational tasks. Each process has been developed in order to be smoothly
translated into an automated workflow: a practical input triage implementation process has been
described using a structured notation. Such an approach provides the service architecture model and the
processes to be implemented in a threat intelligence platform supporting orchestration and automation
functionalities.
The adoption of a service architecture provides a set of advantages. It is extremely useful to fasten
daily routine tasks: it removes repetitive actions burden from CTI team and unlocks time and resources
for higher added value activities. In addition, automated workflows provide guidance to the CTI
analysts, keeping them disciplined in following required steps and facilitating task execution through
integration with intelligence tools and services: as a result, CTI team’s efficiency increases.
Moreover, the implementation of the architecture allows to measure the effectiveness of CTI
activities and, consequently, to collect metrics useful for improving performance. Finally, CTI analysts
coordination is made easier, a particularly important aspect when the CTI team or part of it works
remotely.
CTI service architecture has been designed to be technologically agnostic to avoid lock-in risks and
vendor polarization. This is undeniably a strong suit, but its implementation could require a significant
effort.
In addition, the CTI service architecture is subject to continuous improvements and optimizations
based on experience gathered during its application in daily activities. With this approach, an increased
level of automation is expected, especially on routine tasks, in order to improve the effectiveness of CTI
analysts’ efforts in core areas.
However, this work could stimulate debates among information sharing and trusted group entities
peers discussion, raise the awareness on their level of maturity in producing effective CTI and let them
identify gaps to address. Bridging the gaps, e.g. with the adoption of similar service oriented approaches
for CTI capability, would increase the effectiveness of the information sharing by levelling-up the
ability to consume and produce intelligence, hence improving the cyber resilience of the whole
ecosystem.
The integrated, fully defined and automatable processes described in the present paper can contribute
to align CTI activities towards a common model, enhancing the effectiveness of collaboration and
information sharing. Moreover, it aims to be advantageous for the quality metrics’ perspective of the
produced threat intelligence, to feed further threat led penetration testing, empowering their
effectiveness and ensuring a level-playing field among the involved entities.
A more effective information sharing among financial entities would ease the application of DORA
regulation, which is expected to increase the number of involved organizations and the amount of cyber
related information exchanged between them. To a greater extent, a similar benefit is foreseen for critical
infrastructures going to apply the NIS2 directive where an improvement of the information sharing is
strongly recommended. Another example could be the TIBER-EU framework where a CTI service
could help to produce organization targeted threat intelligence needed to design threat scenarios.
As a consequence, the proposed CTI service architecture could be a case study also for FMIs and
may stimulate a beneficial collaboration among financial entities.
8. References
G. Research, «How to Respond to the 2022 Cyberthreat Landscape,» 2022. [Online].
ENISA – The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, «ENISA Threat Landscape
2020 – Cyber threat intelligence overview,» 20 October 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyberthreatintelligenceoverview/at_download/full
Report.
ENISA – The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, «NIS Investment 2022,»
November 2022. [Online]. Available: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nisinvestments-2022/@@download/fullReport.
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), «Mitigating systemic cyber risk,» 2022.
[Online].
Available:
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.SystemiCyberRisk.220127~b6655fa027.en
.pdf.
ECB – European Central Bank, «CROE-Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations,»
[Online].
Available:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pdf/cons/cyberresilience/Cyber_resilience_oversight_exp
ectations_for_financial_market_infrastructures.pdf.
Opte Project, [Online]. Available: https://www.opte.org/.
S. Varga, J. Brynielsson e U. Franke, «Cyber-threat perception and risk management in
the swedish financial sector,» Computers & Security, 2021.
P. Digregorio e B. Giannetto, «Development of Cyber Threat Intelligence apparatus in a
central
bank,»
October
2019.
[Online].
Available:
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2019-0517/QEF_517_19.pdf.
European Parliament and Council, «(NIS2) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December
2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union,» 2022.
[Online].
Available:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555.
European Commission, «Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector,»
2022.
[Online].
Available:
R. Brown e P. Stirparo, «SANS 2022 Cyber Threat Intelligence Survey,» 2022.
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), «Systemic cyber risk,» 2020. [Online].
Available:
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.report200219_systemiccyberrisk~101a096
85e.en.pdf.
W. S. Brei, «Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure,» Joint Military
Intelligence College – Occasional Paper Number Two, Washington DC, 1996.
K. Sherman, The Theory of Intelligence, CIA Books, 1968.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) of US Armed Forces, «Cyberspace Operations,» pp. 3-12,
2018.
M. Luchs e C. Doerr, «Measuring Your Cyber Threat Intelligence Maturity, a 5-minute
introduction,» Hasso Lattner Institut.
K. Oosthoek e C. Doerr, «Cyber Threat Intelligence: A Product Without a Process?,»
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.
[18]
B. Shin e P. B. Lowry, «A review and theoretical explanation of the ‘CyberthreatIntelligence (CTI) capability’ that needs to be fostered in information security practitioners
and how this can be accomplished,» Computers & Security, vol. 92.
European Banking Authority (EBA), «Final Report on Guidelines on ICT and security
management,»
2019.
[Online].
Available:
https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Publications/Gui
delines/2020/GLs%20on%20ICT%20and%20security%20risk%20management/872936/Fin
al%20draft%20Guidelines%20on%20ICT%20and%20security%20risk%20management.pd
BoE – Bank of England, «CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing – Understanding Cyber Threat
Intelligence Operations,» 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/financial-stability/financial-sector-continuity/understanding-cyber-threatintelligenc.
T. D. Wagner, K. Mahbub, E. Palomar e A. Abdullah, «Cyber threat intelligence sharing:
Survey and research directions,» Computers & Security, vol. 87, 2019.
ENISA – The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, «Exploring the opportunities
and limitations of current Threat Intelligence Platforms,» March 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/exploring-the-opportunities-and-limitations-of-c.
S. Brown, J. Gommers e O. Serrano, «From Cyber Security Information Sharing to Threat
Management,» in Computer Science, Engineering Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop
on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security, 2015.
ENISA, «Threat Landscape 2022,,» November 2022. [Online]. Available:
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape2022/@@download/fullReport.
G7, «G-7 FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS FOR THREAT-LED PENETRATION
TESTING,» 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizie/2018/G7FE-Threat-Led-Penetration-Testing.pdf?language_id=1.
BIS – Bank for International Settlements, «Guidance on cyber resilience for financial
market infrastructures,» [Online]. Available: https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d146.pdf.
ECB – European Central Bank, «TIBER-EU Guidance for Target Threat Intelligence
Report,» July 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyberresilience/tiber-eu/shared/pdf/Final_TIBEREU_Guidance_for_Target_Threat_Intelligence_July_2020.pdf.
M. Papazoglou e W. V. Den, «Service-oriented design and development methodology,»
vol. 2(4), 2006.
M. Phythian, in Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, Routledge, 2013.
NIST- National Institute of Standards and Technology, «Special Publication 800-150
Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing,» 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-150.pdf.
A. Ramsdale, S. Shiaeles e N. Kolokotronis, «A Comparative Analysis of Cyber-Threat
Intelligence Sources, Formats and Languages,» Electronics, vol. 9, 2020.
J. Ettinger, Cyber IntelligenceTradecraft Report – The State of Cyber Intelligence
Practices in the United States, Carnegie Mellon University, 2019.
J. Hanson, «The Admiralty Code: A Cognitive Tool for Self-Directed Learning,»
International Journal of Learning, Teaching and Educational Research, vol. 14, n. 1, pp. 97115, 2015.
FIRST – Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, «Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)
– FIRST Standards Definitions and Usage Guidance – Version 1.0,» [Online]. Available:
https://www.first.org/tlp/docs/tlp-v1.pdf.
[35]
G. Pernul e F. Menges, «Unifying Cyber Threat Intelligence,» in International Conference
Trending
- LUCA ZINGARETTI IN VISITA ALLA MOSTRA DI PALAZZO DEI DIAMANTI. UN RITORNO NELLA CITTÀ DEL SUO ESORDIO AL CINEMA. L’ATTORE IN QUESTI GIORNI A FERRARA PER “MARCO POLO E LE CITTÀ INVISIBILI”, IN SCENA AL TEATRO COMUNALE
- MANOVRA: BERGAMINI, “FORZA ITALIA LAVORA PER MIGLIORARLA, IL CAMPO LARGO PENSA A NUOVE TASSE
- GIORNATA VITTIME STRADA. DE CORATO (FDI): SICUREZZA È PRIORITÀ PER GOVERNO MELONI
- Le Commissioni consiliari di lunedì 16 novembre
- Emergenza abitativa, lunedì a Forlì il convegno sul Piano Casa. Tassinari «Più garanzie ai proprietari per rimettere in affitto le case sfitte»
- FERRARA, FABBRI SECONDO TRA I SINDACI DEI COMUNI TRA 120MILA E 260MILA ABITANTI CON IL 58,5% DI GRADIMENTO SECONDO IL SONDAGGIO LAB21. SINDACO: “UN RISULTATO CHE MI RENDE FELICE. IL CONSENSO VA CONQUISTATO OGNI GIORNO
- Domenica ecologica, oltre mille alberi e piantine donati ai cittadini al Parco San Giuliano
- MANIFESTAZIONI A PARMA, RUSSO (FDI): GRAZIE A FORZE DELL’ORDINE, SMENTITA LA NARRAZIONE DI UN GOVERNO CHE REPRIME IL DISSENSO
- NEWS RELEASE: Six months on, accessing hard-to-reach communities key to halting Ebola outbreak
- BASKET IN CARROZZINA, LA BRIANTEA84 CANTU’ CONQUISTA LA SUPERCOPPA MARTIN MANCINI