(AGENPARL) – gio 27 aprile 2023 [ISW Logo]
Special Update
Reframing the US policy debate on a ‘long war’ in Ukraine
Nataliya Bugayova, Non-Resident Russia Fellow
April 27, 2023
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Key Takeaways:
– The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Nor is the US fighting a proxy war.
– A long Russian war is not an inherent Kremlin goal, but rather the Kremlin’s adaptation in pursuit of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
– The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given, however, and disproportionately depends on whether Russia is given time and space to rebuild its capabilities.
– The Kremlin’s ability to threaten the US and NATO, as well as the future of Russia’s power globally, disproportionately depends on Russia’s gains or losses in Ukraine.
– Metering Western support to Ukraine and inadequately resourcing all of the required Ukrainian counteroffensives — not just the next one — will protract Russia’s war and increase the associated risks for the US.
– The US risks facing the same escalation risks under worse conditions if it does not help Ukraine liberate its territory through a series of successive counteroffensive operations.
– The West has a profound ability to shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The West’s problem is not capability; it is perception.
The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, intentional Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Ukraine is defending itself against an unprovoked Russian invasion, and the US is supporting Ukraine. Comparisons to Iraq or Afghanistan are not appropriate.
The policy debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, intentional Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a long war for the US, because the US is not fighting this war. Ukraine is defending itself against an unprovoked Russian invasion, and the US is supporting Ukraine. Comparisons to Iraq or Afghanistan are not appropriate.
The US is not fighting a proxy war. Ukraine’s choice to defend itself against Russia’s genocidal efforts is exogenous to the West’s decision-making. Ukraine would have defended itself against Russia’s 2022 invasion in the absence of support from its partners – at the cost of more territory and lives. Even in 2014, when Ukraine’s military capability and Western willingness to counter Russia were minimal, barely equipped Ukrainian volunteers rushed to the frontline to combat Russian aggression.[1]
The West and Ukraine are not protracting or spreading this war; Russia is. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is entirely a war of choice. The Kremlin chose to launch a full-scale invasion despite the years-long presence of a peace framework (that the Kremlin routinely violated) and years of diplomatic efforts by Ukraine and the West. The Kremlin is choosing to protract this war and can choose to end it at any point.
Fixating on the “long war” scenario obfuscates the very real US interest at stake in Ukraine. The US problem is not a long war per se. The US problem is the risk of escalation in which the US will need to fight in this war – a risk that increases if Russia’s war protracts and if Russia keeps its gains in Ukraine.