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05/04/2022 09:05 PM EDT
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
Washington, D.C.
MR PRICE: []Good afternoon, everyone. Maybe I should say good evening. I am very sorry for the delay. I assume you all have seen a statement that is just hitting your inboxes regarding the fact that Secretary Blinken has tested positive for COVID. The good news is that he is fully vaccinated; he is boosted. He is experiencing only mild symptoms. He will quarantine at home; he will follow CDC guidelines. I know he very much look forwards to returning to the office, returning to his full schedule, and returning to the road just as soon as he is able to do so.
So with that, happy to take your questions.
QUESTION: Is the China speech still on – tomorrow —
MR PRICE: The Secretary looks forward to delivering the address that was scheduled for tomorrow. Unfortunately, it will not talk place tomorrow, but we’ll find an alternative date just as soon as we can.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. On North Korea and South Korea, China: North Korea fired an ICBM yesterday. How will the United States respond to Kim Jong-un’s repeated missile provocations? And I have one other one next.
MR PRICE: []Well, I am not sure if I heard you perfectly, but it was a ballistic missile that the North Koreans launched. We condemn that launch. Like the DPRK’s recent tests of at least three intercontinental ballistic missiles, this launch is a clear violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. It demonstrates the fact that North Korea’s ballistic missile program, its nuclear weapons program, it pose – they pose a threat to the DPRK’s neighbors. They pose a threat to the region. They pose a threat to peace and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific.
When it comes to the United States – and we have said this before; we’ve said this in the aftermath of other recent provocations – our commitment to the defense of our treaty allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, that commitment is ironclad. We have been and will – we will continue to be in close touch, in close coordination with our treaty allies, the ROK and Japan. And together, we will respond to the provocations that we have seen emanate from the DPRK. This is also something that we will address with our allies and partners in New York. That is work that is ongoing.
QUESTION: But the – when North Korea launched the missile yesterday, Chinese ambassador to Korean Peninsula, Liu Xiaoming, (inaudible) China has never criticized North Korea. How can you say about this, that China has never criticized North Korea, so they always say that you better – people are talking – is better way is that they both need to dialogue, but they never have?
MR PRICE: Well, I would refer to what I said earlier, and that is the fact that each of these provocations has been a violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. The PRC, of course, is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The fact that there are multiple UN Security Council resolutions, the fact that there are multiple statements that have emanated from the UN Security Council chamber itself is a testament to the fact that countries around the world – including the PRC – recognize that the DPRK’s ballistic missile, its nuclear program is a source of instability, it is a source of insecurity, and that it is a threat to the broader region.
We will continue to work very closely with Japan and the ROK on this challenge. But of course, we will work with allies as well as partners around the world. And we, as we’ve recently said, have had recent engagements with our PRC counterparts on the danger that is posed by the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program. Our special envoy,, has had recent engagements; Secretary Blinken has had an opportunity in recent months to engage Wang Yi on this issue as well. It is a challenge that we, on every occasion, also do address with our PRC counterparts.
QUESTION: Lastly, as you know, China is ignoring North Korea’s continued missile provocation. There is no reason why South Korea should get approval from China to deploy THAAD for its own defense – THAAD missile. If South Koreans’ incoming government wants to deploy additional THAAD, will the United States consider it?
MR PRICE: Every country has the inherent right to self-defense. As I said before, our commitment to the defense of our treaty allies, the ROK in this case, it is ironclad. These will be discussions that we will have as allies regarding how best we can see to it that our commitment to the defense of the ROK remains ironclad.
QUESTION: Follow-up on that?
MR PRICE: Yep.
QUESTION: So is it your assessment that this was a ballistic missile but not an ICBM?
MR PRICE: It is our assessment that it is a ballistic missile. We’re not in a position to provide any additional detail at this time.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR PRICE: Yes.
QUESTION: News out of Iran today said that the Iranian Swedish detainee will be – his sentence is going to be carried out towards the end of this month. He is charged with spying for Israel and is to be executed. Today, apparently, also, the Iranian foreign minister spoke with – and that announcement out of Tehran, news out of Tehran is no coincidence. But yesterday Iran – I mean, the trial of a former officer at the – Tehran’s prosecution office, his trial ended in Stockholm, Sweden for having a hand in the execution of political prisoners in 1988. Given that the U.S. has more experience than other countries with its citizens being held hostage for different reasons and getting different sentences, do other countries reach out to the U.S. to see how to handle situations like this?
MR PRICE: Well, let me first say []something about this particular case. It’s one that we’re watching very closely, and we’re watching it very closely because it is especially egregious. It is an egregious case of arbitrary detention of this Swedish Iranian doctor, Ahmad Reza Jalali. He has been held by Iranian authorities. Both this department, the State Department, along with the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran, have highlighted Jalali’s case and human reports on human rights conditions in Iran. It was a case that was featured in our Human Rights Report.
We know that, as you alluded to, Iran does have a long history of unjust imprisonment of foreign nationals for use as political leverage. It continues to engage in a range of human rights abuses, which include large-scale arbitrary or unlawful detention of individuals, some of whom have faced torture or worse, in some cases execution, after a failure to receive due process and enduring unjust trials.
These practices are outrageous; we continuously document them. We, to your question, do often consult with our allies and partners. As you know, this is an issue that is quite personal for us as a country. Americans remain detained wrongfully, unjustly in Iran. They have been separated from their families for far too long. But it is not only Americans who suffer this treatment, and of course, countless Iranians do as well, dual nationals do as well. So yes, it is something that we routinely discuss with our closest partners to determine how best we can address this shameful practice of wrongful detention, how best we can work together to seek to affect the safe release of our nationals, and importantly, to work together to seek to create and to underscore a norm against this outrageous practice.
This is something that Secretary Blinken has been quite focused on. Our Canadian counterparts have put forward a series of very constructive, very useful proposals that will help to establish this norm by which countries around the world will work together not only to condemn this egregious practice, but to seek to put an end to it by holding accountable, collectively, those countries that are most responsible for this practice. And of course, Iran, unfortunately, is one of those countries.
Yes. Courtney.
QUESTION: Can we stay on Iran?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Just a – do you have a status update on JCPOA compliance negotiations? You’ve spoken before and we’ve talked many times about the window closing, the runway being short. Where are we now?
MR PRICE: Happy to provide an update. You will find that the update is not all that dissimilar from what you heard when this was last asked, I think it was day before yesterday. The fact is, as everyone in this room knows, that we had achieved significant progress in the P5+1 context in Vienna in recent months, but of course we have not been able to close an agreement and it remains uncertain and unclear if we will be able to. We remain engaged with our European partners and we have spoken of the role of Enrique Mora, the helpful role that he has played conveying messages back and forth between the United States and, in this case, Iran.
We remain committed to testing the proposition as to whether we can achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for one reason, and for one reason only: a mutual return to compliance – that is to say, if Iran were to once again submit itself to the permanent, to the verifiable limits and checks imposed on its nuclear program – that would be manifestly in our national interest. Yes, this process has dragged on for much longer than we would like, for far too long, but the fact is that a mutual return to compliance – if Iran were to re?enter the JCPOA, if we in turn were to re-enter the JCPOA – the result would work to our national security benefit.
That is because ever since 2018, when the last administration left the deal that was working, a deal with which Iran was in compliance, Iran’s nuclear program has advanced in ways that are unacceptable to us. And the net result of those advancements is the fact that Iran has gone from a breakout time – that is to say, the time that it would take Iran to acquire the fissile material necessary for a nuclear weapon should it make the decision to weaponize – has gone from a highwater mark of about a year at the outset of the deal to something that is best now measured in weeks.
And to us, that is unacceptable. And I say that we remain engaged on trying to determine whether a mutual return to compliance is in the offing because a mutual return to compliance would change that dynamic. It would significantly prolong the breakout time. It would change the dynamic. It would reimpose the most stringent verification and monitoring program ever peacefully negotiated on a nuclear program that has not been subject to it for several years now.
So —
QUESTION: Are you not yet at the point of diminishing returns? I’m sorry to cut you off, but we – I mean, we’ve talked about the time running short. We’ve now blown past what seem to be several kind of guideposts for timing on negotiating a (inaudible).
MR PRICE: There seems to be an impression that there was always a dated fixed on the calendar for us, and I’ve seen this reported, but I would just note that it flies in the face of what I have consistently said. We don’t think of this – and I’m sorry to go back to this; I’m sure you’re all sick of hearing it – as a temporal clock. This is a technical clock, and it is a technical clock for one simple reason: what we’re looking at is the technical assessment of the point at which a mutual return to compliance – that is to say, the point at which re-entering the deal would not convey benefits, nonproliferation benefits that outweigh the advancements and the implications of the advancements that Iran has been able to achieve while these nuclear shackles has been off – have been off.
So we are still at a point where, if we were able to negotiate a mutual return to compliance, that breakout time would be prolonged from where it is now. We would have greater transparency. There would be those permanent, verifiable limits reimposed on Iran. That would be in our national security interest.
Now, to your point, it is true that there will come a time when, on the basis of those technical assessments, a mutual return to compliance and the nonproliferation benefits it would convey would not, in fact, outweigh the implications of the advancements that Iran has been able to achieve in its nuclear program.
So we are constantly taking a close look at the state of Iran’s nuclear program, of what it is doing, the implications of those actions, and comparing that to the deal that may still be in the offing. But I should add that because the JCPOA, a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA, is very much an uncertain proposition, we are now preparing equally for either scenario – a scenario in which we have a mutual return to compliance, in which that breakout time is elongated and a point at which this – what has the potential to devolve further into a nuclear crisis is put back into a box.
We are also preparing with our allies and partners for a scenario in which there is not a JCPOA and we will have to turn to other tactics and other approaches to fulfill what is for us a requirement, a commitment that President Biden has made that Iran, whether there is a JCPAO or whether there is not a JCPAO, must never, never, never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.
QUESTION: Ned, can you just say – you keep saying there will come a time when it won’t be worthwhile anymore. But you can say definitively right now today that that time has not – there has not been a judgement made that that time has come and gone?
MR PRICE: That time has not come and gone.
QUESTION: Okay.
QUESTION: Ned, moving on?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Axios has reported today that when the Israeli national security advisor was here and spoke with Jake Sullivan that they – it was agreed that they increase pressure on Iran to finalize this deal and prepare, if it doesn’t happen, for later to push Iran towards this. Can you say anything?
MR PRICE: []What I can say is that we regularly have occasion to consult with our Israeli partners on this. I know that Secretary Blinken has recently met with Foreign Minister Lapid. He’s met with him several times in recent months. He’s been on the phone with him several times in recent months. When there were active negotiations in Vienna, we would routinely brief our Israeli partners before each round, during each round, after each round. Secretary Blinken has done that himself to Foreign Minister Lapid. Secretary Blinken has done that himself with Prime Minister Bennett and his predecessor as well. So I’m not going to detail those consultations, but it is regularly a topic of discussion with our Israeli partners.
Shaun.
QUESTION: Can we go to Ukraine?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: The Russians have said that they’re going to again have a ceasefire for three days at the steel plant in Mariupol. Do you see this as – do you see anything positive in this? Do you – are you hopeful that this could actually come to fruition?
MR PRICE: []Well, every time an individual is able to take advantage of a humanitarian corridor, a humanitarian pause to reach safety, that is a good thing. What we want to see happen, however, is a prolonged humanitarian corridor, prolonged humanitarian access. What we have consistently seen, and we’ve seen this even in recent days, is the tendency on the part of the Russian Federation to embrace a so?called humanitarian pause to cloak itself in the guise of an actor that has humanitarian concerns only to quickly and promptly resume shelling and violence, including against civilians who are trapped in besieged areas, including in Mariupol.
Our concern is – and what we want to see happen – is that this humanitarian access be motivated by genuine humanitarian concern and not the desire on the part of the Russian Federation to achieve a PR victory, to claim it has humanitarian concerns when its only concerns is propaganda.
Now, in recent days, there have been over a hundred individuals who have been able to reach safety as far as Zaporizhzhia in recent days. There are still hundreds of people who are trapped in the steel plant. There are still thousands of people who are in the besieged city of Mariupol who have been once again subject to shelling, to violence. People need to be let out. Humanitarian aid needs to be let in. That dynamic needs to last. That’s what we care about.
QUESTION: Ned, just a follow up on that. There have been reports in Ukraine that the Russians are planning a, quote/unquote, “victory parade” in Mariupol for Monday to mark their Victory Day against Nazi Germany. I mean, first of all, is there anything the United States know about that? But is – how would that be seen? What do you think the message would be if that were to —
MR PRICE: Well, I know there’s lots of speculation about what the Russians may or may not do on May 9th, but I can tell you that May 8th and May 9th, it’s not only a day of significance for the Russians. It is a significant day for all of Europe and for the United States too, the anniversary of the defeat of the advance of Nazi Germany at the end of World War II. So this is not a day that any single country owns.
But what I can tell you is that on May 8th, on May 9th, our strategy and our approach is going to be the same strategy and the same effective approach that we have employed since February 24th, since the Russian invasion began. That is to support in many different ways our Ukrainian partners, to hold the Kremlin and the Russian Federation to account, and to do that with allies and partners around the world – dozens of allies around the world across four continents.
So I don’t have anything to preview for what they might do, but again, to claim as a victory, to parade through the streets of a city that not all that long ago was filled with hundreds of thousands of civilians, of people who were doing nothing but seeking livelihoods, pursuing their lives – I think that says a lot in the aftermath of a brutalization by Russian bombs, by Russian shells, by Russian artillery. And if that is the focus of any Victory Day parade, any Victory Day celebration, I think that speaks volumes about the nature of the Kremlin and the nature of what they’re doing to the people of Ukraine.
QUESTION: Thank you. President of the European Council Charles Michel said today that the European Union will provide additional military equipment to Moldova to strengthen its resilience. I wonder if the U.S. considers additional military assistance to Moldova and Georgia, and I wonder if you see any imminent threat of new Russian aggression in the region against these countries.
MR PRICE: []Both Georgia and Moldova, our – are important partners of the United States. We are committed to their sovereignty, to their independence, to their territorial integrity. We have demonstrated that commitment in a number of ways. When it comes to Moldova, we spoke about this, I believe, on Tuesday. We recently restarted a strategic dialogue with our Moldovan counterparts. Secretary Blinken was recently in Chi?in?u, where he met with the Moldovan leadership; had an opportunity to meet with Moldovan leadership once again here for that strategic dialogue.
It is a partnership that spans many different elements. We have provided significant amount – a significant amount of humanitarian assistance to our Moldovan partners. Our militaries have an effective partnership. They have served together side by side as far away as Kosovo, and our commitment, as I said before, to the sovereignty, to the independence, to the territorial integrity of Moldova and to Georgia, which we have demonstrated in our own right as well – that is something that we will continue to support.
QUESTION: And any negotiations planned with Georgian side about the latest developments in the region and Russian aggression?
MR PRICE: We’re always in touch through our embassy, through the department here with our partners in the region. That certainly includes with our counterparts in Tbilisi. Those discussions are ongoing. Again, to your previous question, we know that Vladimir Putin may harbor aspirations to wage aggression against other countries in the region. I think we are demonstrating in response to how we are providing our Ukrainian partners with what they need to be effective against this instance, this egregious instance of Russian aggression – we are demonstrating that the United States and our allies and partners won’t stand for that type of activity.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) news network, Pakistan. Sir, last week there was a suicide bomb blast in Pakistan. Due to situation in Afghanistan, we have seen rising terrorism in Pakistan. The security assistance was suspended by previous U.S. administration. It is still suspended. Is there any reviews going on?
MR PRICE: []Well, at the time, we strongly condemned the terrorist attack against Karachi University, a university in Pakistan. We reiterate that condemnation today. A terrorist attack anywhere is an affront to humanity everywhere, but for a terrorist attack to take place at a university, or at a religious site, or at some of the locations we’ve seen recently – that is a true affront to mankind.
When it comes to your question, what I’ll say is that we value our bilateral relationship. We want to continue to work together in areas where we do have mutual interests with our Pakistani partners. That includes counterterrorism. That includes border security as well.
QUESTION: Thank you so much. Jahanzaib Ali from ARY News TV Pakistan. Sir, the U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom recommended to include India into their blacklist, like for the religious freedom violations. So what would be the – expecting to see in regards to, like, second time in a row a U.S. commission recommended India to be included into the CPC countries?
MR PRICE: []Well, USCIRF is an independent commission. It’s not a governmental entity. It does provide recommendations and guidance to the U.S. Government. It is something that we look at closely as we evaluate conditions of religious freedom or lack thereof around the world. I have no doubt that our experts in our Office of International Religious Freedom will take a close look at the report that USCIRF has submitted as they prepare for our determinations and our findings when it comes to religious freedom around the world.
QUESTION: And on China, can you give a preview of the China strategy speech?
MR PRICE: []I was going to deflect that question and to duck it, pointing to the fact that there would be a speech tomorrow. Unfortunately, there won’t be a speech tomorrow, but there will be a speech at some point in the not too distant future. So I will then duck that question pointing to that date in the not too distant future.
QUESTION: And about Secretary Blinken, did he take an antigen test or a PCR test? It said about taking – took one on Tuesday and also this morning.
MR PRICE: []He tested positive earlier this afternoon via PCR test. He had tested negative as recently as earlier this morning, and again yesterday with antigen tests.
QUESTION: Okay, well, let’s just stay on that – and I don’t know how much you covered at the beginning before I was here.
MR PRICE: I think I answered everyone’s questions.
QUESTION: No, on this?
MR PRICE: I’m kidding.
QUESTION: On the COVID? So you say that he’s not considered a close contact with the President.
MR PRICE: That’s right.
QUESTION: Certainly he’s – correct me if I’m wrong – a close contact with the Swedish foreign minister, who was —
MR PRICE: That’s right.
QUESTION: — here this afternoon, and potentially with the Mexican foreign secretary who was here yesterday and everyone who was at that luncheon. So have they all been informed? And then why, if he tested negative this morning with an antigen test, did he get a PCR test this afternoon? Was it because he was feeling symptomatic (inaudible)?
MR PRICE: So we are in the process and we have notified those individuals with whom he has been in close contact following CDC guidance. So in most cases, if not all cases, we’ve been in a position to notify them. The Secretary, as you know, he has young kids in the house. As you know, he was around a number of people this weekend. So as a matter of precaution, he does regularly test. He reported symptoms this afternoon. He received a PCR test shortly thereafter.
QUESTION: So in other words, he didn’t get the PCR test this afternoon because he was – he was feeling symptoms. He got it just because —
MR PRICE: He reported symptoms this afternoon and thereafter received a PCR test.
QUESTION: So that’s why he took the PCR test?
MR PRICE: Correct. Correct.