(AGENPARL) – lun 24 aprile 2023 This update covers developments through April 21 at Noon Eastern Time.
[ISW Logo]
China-Taiwan Weekly Update
[Donate Today to Support ISW](https://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?f=001490UOiF3QhTm6dwp9TeDZXTfO35uOjOFN3zLYXL_HvkPhbPtZRFORk2QFGZ_KFwMy6yK0FgZA2binhMKS5DhZuqXcOGAObmn6XQchDr8Fs22k_dEHmkJL8mxIfb_pvxZZ5_OEgooEVWD4gsOZ4-8JNJeC8BHpw-oT90aRb770rhG4ckfhd2J4g==&c=te0-EWknVeXrsMI7cSbXjjqj3sqtPkra5_j1w56BLARAlpL69Uv0yQ==&ch=cA7-rPEhbHLTjPLAkzH8mvdCUaAENuSiItGh88vkWt1-OShJ0jozkg==)
Authors: Nils Peterson, Roy Eakin, and Virginia Wang of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: [Dan Blument](https://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?f=001490UOiF3QhTm6dwp9TeDZXTfO35uOjOFN3zLYXL_HvkPhbPtZRFORl7-VqGJWN4vP1KgR-GJ5B8SSogj3bQKnxG95EGJflf_EOz8DG2xNOxDv11cBy92gVxsoq2VSttryy4sdI-5t3MIt6sFE6dH60pkEOFK-miXE-QNoXCZc0Q4Z0EWand1Iw==&c=te0-EWknVeXrsMI7cSbXjjqj3sqtPkra5_j1w56BLARAlpL69Uv0yQ==&ch=cA7-rPEhbHLTjPLAkzH8mvdCUaAENuSiItGh88vkWt1-OShJ0jozkg==)[hal](https://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?f=001490UOiF3QhTm6dwp9TeDZXTfO35uOjOFN3zLYXL_HvkPhbPtZRFORl7-VqGJWN4vP1KgR-GJ5B8SSogj3bQKnxG95EGJflf_EOz8DG2xNOxDv11cBy92gVxsoq2VSttryy4sdI-5t3MIt6sFE6dH60pkEOFK-miXE-QNoXCZc0Q4Z0EWand1Iw==&c=te0-EWknVeXrsMI7cSbXjjqj3sqtPkra5_j1w56BLARAlpL69Uv0yQ==&ch=cA7-rPEhbHLTjPLAkzH8mvdCUaAENuSiItGh88vkWt1-OShJ0jozkg==) and [Frederick W. Kagan](https://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?f=001490UOiF3QhTm6dwp9TeDZXTfO35uOjOFN3zLYXL_HvkPhbPtZRFORkNlgYpC64yR0FdjSiDMhLF43OWEeQJLHv8VALDJkqZXE55iXoSKnM6WZlrgS0HZk0IwMWhCCJePLqOuztaeeNRVoMiT_MOdvLixS8BIBF-vDak-m9DMQuQb2WsI00zCmA==&c=te0-EWknVeXrsMI7cSbXjjqj3sqtPkra5_j1w56BLARAlpL69Uv0yQ==&ch=cA7-rPEhbHLTjPLAkzH8mvdCUaAENuSiItGh88vkWt1-OShJ0jozkg==) of the American Enterprise Institute
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. This update covers developments through April 21 at Noon Eastern Time.
Key Takeaways
– The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try to create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace.
– CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security.
– Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears.
Geopolitical Initiatives
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may view the tenth anniversary on March 23 of Xi Jinping’s announcement of a “community with a shared future for mankind” as an opportunity to redouble efforts to focus international governance discussions on economic development. Xi’s speech laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives, which aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architecture towards Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang used the anniversary to publish a report about Sino-Russian relations that argued against viewing the world in a democracy versus autocracy framework but rather as a “struggle between development and [the] containment of development.” The report builds on Xi’s 2013 speech, which laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives that aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architectures towards Beijing. Such programs include the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives.
Qin Gang’s report is also part of the CCP’s effort to gain “discourse power” by focusing international governance discussions on economic development rather than governance models. “Discourse power” refers to CCP efforts to shape international public opinion about sensitive subjects for the party, such as human rights, in service of setting international norms for discussing such issues. The term is part of Xi’s aim to have CCP narratives gain substantial traction in the global information space as alternatives to those produced in democratic countries. China can use advances in “discourse power” in conjunction with economic engagement to strengthen its ideological appeal amid a larger US–China competition in regions like the Global South. “Discourse power” advances can also encourage these states to support Chinese initiatives in international organizations like the United Nations.