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08/16/2022 09:02 PM EDT
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
Washington, D.C.
2:18 p.m. EDT
MR PRICE: Good afternoon. I’ve actually come emptyhanded today, so I am at your disposal. I say that with only mild trepidation, so Matt, I turn it over to you.
QUESTION: Right. Thank you. Let’s start with Iran. So presumably you’ve had a chance to take a look at the – their response to the EU text. What do you make of it?
MR PRICE: []Well, some of you have heard this from us already today, but we have in fact received Iran’s comments on the EU’s proposed final text. We have received them through the EU. We’re in the process of studying them. We are at the same time engaged in consultations with the EU and our European allies on the way ahead.
All throughout this process, from its earliest days, we’ve taken a deliberate; we’ve taken a principled approach to the negotiations with the remaining JCPOA participants. And more recently, since this deal has essentially been on the table since March, we’ve known what a final deal on a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA would look like. And I made this point yesterday, but it bears repeating: We agree with the high representative. We agree with Mr. Borrell’s fundamental point. What could be negotiated over the course of these past 16, 17 months has been negotiated.
So we’ll continue to study what has been submitted. We’ll continue to consult closely with the EU, with our European allies, other partners, and when we have more to say we’ll share that.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, I mean, when you say what could be negotiated has been negotiated, that would suggest that this is it. That if Iran doesn’t say yes unreservedly to this text that it’s dead.
MR PRICE: Well, I – this will be up to the EU as the mediator and the arbiter to have a say on that question. But I will make the point that these are not simple issues. These are not issues that can be entertained or tabled with – without, for example, the consultations that we’ve had with the EU over the past several weeks, where the parties have had an opportunity to ask questions of the coordinator to seek additional clarity, to seek additional information, and that’s just because of the very complex and by definition complicated nature of the issues that are on the table. So —
QUESTION: But if what could be negotiated has already been negotiated, that – by definition that would imply that there is nothing left to negotiate and that if Iran wants to reopen any part of this, they’re out of luck.
MR PRICE: Broadly speaking, we agree with Mr. Borrell.
QUESTION: But what does that mean, that “what could be negotiated has been negotiated”? Does that mean that there is nothing —
MR PRICE: It means that —
QUESTION: — there’s no opportunity, no room for any further negotiation?
MR PRICE: It means that we have spent the past 16 months or so, since the spring of 2021, going over in exhausting detail through a process that has gone on in our estimation for far too long, far longer than it needs to have gone on. We have gone over the big issues, the issues that are at the core of the two key questions that we sought to find answers to starting in the spring of last year. On the one hand, the steps that Iran would need to take to resume its compliance with the JCPOA – that is to say, the steps that Iran would need to take to once again reimpose the verifiable, the permanent limits on its nuclear program – and on the other hand, the steps that the United States would need to be prepared to take in terms of sanctions relief on Iran’s nuclear program if Iran agreed to that proposition.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR PRICE: So the big issues have been discussed. They have been tabled. We believe they have been largely settled. That was the point of the EU —
QUESTION: Well, “largely settled” is not the same as “what could be negotiated has been negotiated.” So it’s a simple yes or no question; there’s a simple yes or no answer to this, I think. Unless there’s not. I mean, unless there is something more that you are willing to talk with the Iranians about. Has everything – is this the final offer? Is there nothing that can be changed about it? Is there anything left that you’re willing to negotiate?
MR PRICE: Well, this is the agreement – this is the text that the EU has put on the table that is substantially based on the March deal that has been on the table for several months now. But again, these are complex issues. These are not an uncomplicated – this is not an uncomplicated set of business. And so over the course of the past several weeks, for example, we have had an opportunity – all parties have had an opportunity to pose clarifying questions to elicit additional details.
So I am not prepared to today offer any precise information on the details of the text that the European Union has put forward, the coordinator has put forward. Some of these questions are better directed at the European Union itself. For our part, we are reviewing the response that Iran provided to the EU that in turn was provided to us. Just as we’ve said, we’ve been conveying our feedback privately to the EU. We’ll continue to do that, but we’re not going to detail that feedback.
QUESTION: Last one. Is there anything that Iran is looking for now that you think falls outside the scope of the JCPOA? In other words, that there are – there were at the beginning what you would call extraneous issues that they wanted resolved. Are there any extraneous issues left? And whether there are or not, is there anything that Iran is still looking for that the administration believes that it cannot – can’t give?
MR PRICE: To answer that question, Matt, would require me to violate the cardinal rule of speaking to the text that is on the table or the Iranian response that has been provided to the EU and in turn provided to us. That’s just not something that I’m in a position to do today, but our message, I think, has been loud and clear. It has been heard by the Iranians that this negotiation is about one thing and about one thing only: it’s about the four corners of the JCPOA which is focused exclusively on Iran’s nuclear program, what Iran is permitted to do and in turn what it is required to do to demonstrate to the international community, including to international weapons inspectors, that it has permanent, verifiable limits in place on the extent of its nuclear program.
QUESTION: You are not going to give us any details about the text or Iran’s suggestions, but you always talk about being serious. You are always saying U.S. is very serious, and you were asking Iranian to be – to show seriousness. Knowing what is in Iran’s latest and final suggestions, do you evaluate that Iranian side is serious now? Can you tell us at least that one?
MR PRICE: I don’t want to prejudge that. I don’t want to offer a definitive answer in large part because we are still studying it. It will require some time to digest what has been provided to the EU and in turn what has been provided to us, but it is our hope that as we have now approached what should be the final stage of this that the Iranians will show – demonstrate that serious – seriousness of purpose that we have not consistently seen until now. I made the point just a moment ago, but we started this process in the spring of 2021. It is now nearly late summer of 2022.
If all sides – if the Iranians had – had demonstrated a seriousness of purpose from the earliest days of this, we would have been able to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA in relatively short order. It would have taken some time precisely because these are not simple issues. There are some challenging technical details that would need to be worked out, but there was no reason that we should be speaking to where we are today, August 16th of 2022. But again, as for what has been submitted within the past 12 or so hours, it’s something we’re taking a very close look at.
QUESTION: So —
MR PRICE: And when we have additional details to share, we will.
QUESTION: Are you chasing any deadlines at the moment to submit your final answer?
MR PRICE: The European Union – the coordinator has been very clear about their expectations. We’re not going to speak to those expectations, but we have been conveying our feedback regularly and consistently and privately to the EU.
QUESTION: Ned, I just —
MR PRICE: Yes.
QUESTION: — want to follow up on something that you said. So you were actually prepared to go back to the deal back when you started it. This whole tardiness or – is really the responsibility of the Iranians. They bear responsibility for not arriving at this deal as early as 16 months ago.
MR PRICE: We would not have embarked down this very long, this very windy, this very uncertain road were we – were we not —
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
MR PRICE: — were we not prepared from the earliest days to resume compliance with the JCPOA. It wasn’t even after January 20th where we made that clear on the campaign trail. Then-candidate Biden made clear that he would seek the proposition of a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA. We made that clear during the transition between administrations. And we made that clear very early on after the inauguration.
QUESTION: Ned, you have repeatedly said that Iranian – the Iranians kept adding extraneous demands or whatever they are, but that seems at least by all reports, by all accounts that Iran has dropped, let’s say, the demand for the lifting of the Revolutionary Guard off the terror list, they demand guarantees beyond this administration, and so on, for future administrations and so on. So what is there left? I mean, are you more optimistic today after looking at what the Iranians offered, their deal in the offing in the next few days?
MR PRICE: We don’t – and I – we’ve said this before. We don’t approach this through the lens or with pessimistic view or with an optimistic view in part because the stakes of this. We have to be clear-eyed precisely because of the stakes of this. This is a central challenge. There would be no greater challenge to our foreign policy, to our national security, to the collective security of the international community should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon. And so that is why we have maintained this clear-eyed, steady, principled, pragmatic focus on – at every turn of this diplomacy.
When it comes to the FTO, the President similarly has been clear on that. The FTO designations and other sanctions on the IRGC are beyond the scope of the JCPOA. We have made that point repeatedly. That is certainly an extraneous issue. But, again, not going to detail what precisely we’ve seen in our studies so far of the Iranian response.
QUESTION: My last question on – are you expected to face opposition here at home with, let’s say, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Senator Menendez, Senator Cardin, and others? What if you arrive at a deal with the Iranians? Do you expect opposition here at home?
MR PRICE: Well, right now it’s a hypothetical so I wouldn’t want to entertain a hypothetical. I also wouldn’t want to speak for lawmakers, who, of course, are going to voice their opinions once they see what, if anything, results from this process. So not going to prejudge that.
What I will say is that throughout this we have engaged regularly on an iterative basis with members of Congress, with their staffs, to make sure that they were apprised of the status of our efforts in Vienna, the status of our efforts in Doha, the status of our efforts with our allies and partners in Europe, the status of our efforts with our partners in the Gulf. So we have kept them regularly – and of course, our partners in Israel. So we have kept them regularly updated on the progress. We’ll continue to do that, regardless of the next turn of this process.
The fact of the matter is though that the JCPOA, to our minds – and this is a point that we have reiterated in our briefings with members of Congress – remains the most effective means by which to contain, on a permanent and verifiable basis, Iran’s nuclear program. This is no longer a thought experiment. A couple years ago, a few years ago, one could, on at least a reasonable basis, make the claim that there is a more effective means by which to contain Iran’s nuclear program.
At that time it was a thought experiment. If you distance yourself from the JCPOA through other diplomatic and various coercive means, you might be able to contain Iran’s nuclear program. There at least was a theory. For a while, it was the predominant theory within the last administration. I think the past several years, since May of 2018, have borne out the results of what is no longer a thought experiment. We’ve seen a world in which there is a JCPOA; we are living in a world in which there is not a JCPOA.
I think most observers would like to get back to a point where Iran’s breakout time is not dangerously low, where we are not talking about weeks or less, where we’re talking about months – a world in which we once again have verifiable, permanent limits on Iran’s nuclear program with the various inspections and monitoring regimes that allow international weapons inspectors from the IAEA to verify that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA, and more importantly that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.
We don’t have that now. That is what we want. It is in our interests; it’s in the interests of our partners in Europe; it’s in the interests of our Israeli partners, our partners in the Gulf, and our partners around the world.
QUESTION: Afghanistan?
MR PRICE: Anything else on Iran?
Yes, Daphne and then Gitte.
QUESTION: I know you said you’re regularly in touch with the EU on the response, but at what point do expect that you’ll have a formal response? And is there any discussion on Americans held in Iran amid all of this?
MR PRICE: So on your second question, we have continued to convey very clearly the priority we attach to the safety, the security, and ultimately the safe return of the Americans who are wrongfully, unjustly detained in Iran. In fact, today we’re marking another somber milestone. We’re marking the 250th – 200 and —
QUESTION: 2,500th.
MR PRICE: 2,500th – thank you – day in detention for Siamak Namazi, someone who, of course, has been wrongfully detained for years. The same is true for his father, for other Americans.
Those efforts are ongoing. We’ve been clear throughout that we’re not tying the fates of American citizens to the fate of a proposition, namely a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA that is far from certain. Because a mutual return to compliance has always been far from certain as a possibility, we want the return of our Americans to be a certainty. And so we’ve been careful not to tie these things directly together, but we have continued to – through every channel and through every avenue – to make clear the priority we attach to this and to seek to make progress on that.
Remind me of your first question.
QUESTION: When you will have a formal response.
MR PRICE: I’m just not at a point to offer any prediction at the moment. What I can say with certainty is that we’ll continue to convey our feedback to the EU.
Yes, Gitte.
QUESTION: Actually, my question was about – is about the dual citizens and with the case of Siamak Namazi, his 2,500th day in detention. When you say that the U.S. is not tying their fate to the JCPOA, why hasn’t there been any movement, progress in that regard, getting them released? How does this work? Does the U.S. administration make the first move, ask for – I don’t know – a discussion? Has Iran turned down any recent proposals to sit and talk about that?
MR PRICE: Well, in the first instance, that’s a question that’s much better directed towards Tehran. After all, it’s Tehran – it’s the Iranian regime – that has wrongfully held these Americans, these dual nationals, these other third-country nationals for, in some cases, years on an unjustifiable basis. Were it up to us, these Americans would have been home a long time ago.
So I couldn’t speak to the thinking that may be ongoing in Tehran, but we have been clear that in our estimation these individuals are being held wrongfully, they’re being held unjustly, they’re being held as political pawns, presumably on the part of the Iranian regime to – in an effort to seek to exact leverage or some other concession. It is a practice that is abhorrent. It is a practice that we condemn anywhere and everywhere it takes place. It is a practice that, together with our allies and partners around the world, we are seeking to establish and ultimately to reinforce a norm against this practice and a norm that would require the international community to speak with one voice, to stand up in a united way against this practice, and to hold accountable those countries who would violate what should be an inviolable rule that human beings are not pawns, that individuals should not be wrongfully held for political gain, financial concessions, or for other unjust reasons. Unfortunately, it’s a practice that we see in far too many places around the world.
QUESTION: Afghanistan?
QUESTION: So why hasn’t there been any movement? Have – when was the last time, off the top of your head, that the U.S. tried to get talks in this regard going?
MR PRICE: Well, I will say a couple things. One, as you know, we have not been in direct discussions with the Iranian regime. That has not been our choice. We have said, across a range of issues, including the nuclear issue, that it would be more effective were we in a position to engage directly with Tehran so that we could table and discuss these complex issues directly without having to go through third parties. The same would be true for the Americans and the dual nationals who Iran holds unjustly. We would like to have these discussions in a – through a means by which that is more direct and more effective.
But despite the obstacles that the regime has put up, we have made very clear the priority we attach to their prompt return. It is not something that we say one month, put aside for several months. This has been an ongoing, consistent effort on our part to convey that message very clearly to the Iranian regime.
QUESTION: Afghanistan?
MR PRICE: Anything else on Iran before we move on?
QUESTION: Yes, Iran please.
QUESTION: Iran.
QUESTION: I know you won’t – you don’t want to talk about their response and your response, but what was leaked so far that they are asking for guarantees. Are you willing to give them these guarantees or are you able to give them these guarantees? And I have also a follow-up, please.
MR PRICE: So again, I am not going to weigh in on what has been reported about an Iranian response that hasn’t been made public. What we’ve said – this goes back to last year, and you heard from President Biden and some of his colleagues in the – on the margins of the G20 last year, when President Biden met in Rome with our E3 – with his E3 counterparts. There was a joint statement that emanated from that meeting that made very clear that the United States sought to resume mutual compliance with the JCPOA and we would maintain that compliance with the JCPOA as long as Iran did the same. But when it come to other asks that the regime may or may not have made, that’s just not something I can weigh in on.
QUESTION: My second question. You said that – you’ve been saying this for a long time – that you believe the deal is the best way to prevent Iran from having nuclear. We have not – we are not there, and we’ve been in this situation for three – two years now. Isn’t the current status quo more than efficient for the U.S. than enforcing your sanctions?
MR PRICE: Sorry. Repeat the last part?
QUESTION: Is the current status quo that we are – we are in a status quo now. Is more – is it more than efficient for the U.S. than enforcing your sanctions since you are not able to revive the deal?
MR PRICE: Well, two successive administrations now, to count ours as well, has enforced and levied sanctions against Iran. Unfortunately, during that time Iran’s breakout time has only grown shorter and shorter. So if the option were between the status quo and the status quo namely being a position in which Iran’s breakout time could be measures in weeks or even shorter periods versus what we would be able to accrue on the basis of a deal that would be substantially similar to the proposal that was finalized in March, we would prefer to have those permanent, verifiable limits, and that verification and monitoring regime reimposed on Iran so that that breakout time once again extends so that it’s measured in months.
I think the past several years has very clearly underscored the limitations that come with sanctions and sanctions alone. The last administration pursued a path of so-called maximum pressure. The fatal flaw of that maximum pressure regime is that the world was not united. It was the United States on one side of the table and the rest of the world – including Iran, in some ways – on the opposite side of the table.
QUESTION: Well, it wasn’t the entire international community.
MR PRICE: It was much of the international community. Since the earliest days of this administration, we have focused on once again restoring that unity among our European allies, with partners in the Middle East, to include Israel and to include our Gulf partners as well.
And with that unity restored, we have been more effective in imposing costs and consequences on Iran, but even those costs and consequences have not been able to stall in a meaningful way Iran’s nuclear advancements. So we want to see Iran’s breakout time extended; we want to see permanent, verifiable restrictions reimposed on Iran; and we want to see that verification and monitoring regime once again imposed.
QUESTION: Afghanistan?
QUESTION: So will it not reach to a point that you will say that the deal is dead?
MR PRICE: The deal will be dead as soon as it is no longer in our national security interest to pursue. The point I just made in that admittedly long-winded answer to you is that the deal that has been on the table, at least – referring to the deal that’s been on the table since March – for us is a much more advantageous proposition than the status quo.
QUESTION: Afghanistan, please.
MR PRICE: One more on – a couple more on Iran and then we’ll move on.
QUESTION: The neighbor, Iran’s neighbor?
MR PRICE: And then we’ll – Iran, Iraq, and then —
QUESTION: Afghanistan.
MR PRICE: I promise we will get to Afghanistan, yes.
QUESTION: Thank you so much. There’s one more caveat here, which is the recent attacks against U.S. personnel, U.S. citizens. Since the ball is on your court, and not to drag you into hypotheticals, but if the investigations indeed prove that Iran was behind recent attacks against Rushdie or Alinejad and others, will that impact your response to it recently?
MR PRICE: There’s – there are ongoing investigations in certain cases, but there are some things that we already know. And the fundamental fact – what we have known, what we have always been clear-eyed about – is that Iran is a malign influence. Iran has malign influence in the region, and Iran’s malign influence in some ways extends well beyond the region.
But in many ways, that is at the core of our desire to see Iran’s nuclear program limited in verifiable and permanent ways. Again, Iran would act with far greater impunity – would feel the ability, I should say, to act with far greater impunity – if it had what it could conceive as the shield of a nuclear weapons program. We are committed. President Biden has made a solemn commitment that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon.
That in its own right is something that redounds to our national security, but it also would deprive Iran of the sense of impunity – greater sense of impunity – it would otherwise feel. Every challenge we face with Iran, whether it is its support for proxies, its support for terrorist groups, its ballistic missiles program, its malign cyber activities – every single one of those would be more difficult to confront were Iran to have a nuclear weapons program.
Iraq. Anything else on Iran? One more? Okay.
QUESTION: Just – sorry – not to beat a dead horse here, but I mean, it’s been almost 500 days since these talks started. It’s a little – a couple days less, I guess. You’ve said repeatedly and other administration officials that they’re a few weeks away from having the capability to – their nuclear weapons breakout capability. I mean, several of your allies directly impacted in the region – Gulf, Israel – have voiced opposition to the deal. At home there’s bipartisan – significant bipartisan opposition to the deal.
You’ve mentioned the administration believes this is still in the U.S.’s best national security interest. But I mean, to be fair, these are congressmen, congresswomen, members of Senate that are also – that have access to these classified briefings that you guys are providing them with, and they’re still not convinced. And so when you have all this opposition, I mean, does the administration see that everybody else opposed to this is wrong and you guys are right, first?
And second, can the advances that Iran has made over these years, be it as a result of previous administration or the current policy – can any of these be reversed if a deal is in fact reached in these next couple days or weeks?
MR PRICE: So you put forward a number of premises. I would challenge several of them, but I’ll start with this one.
A number of our partners who were, to put it mildly, not wild about the JCPOA in 2015 and 2016 have over the years changed their tune on the JCPOA. I would point to our partners in the Gulf. Special Envoy Malley has had a number of engagements with our Gulf partners. The Secretary has convened the GCC. Of course, President Biden recently attended a meeting of the GCC at the leaders level.
And in recent months, we’ve seen in formal statements emanate from our Gulf partners their support for our efforts to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA. And they support it not because it’s a foreign policy goal of this administration. They support it for the same reason that we’re pursuing it, because it is in our national security interest; it’s in turn in their national security interest to see to it that Iran is not able to obtain a nuclear weapon.
We’ve seen senior officials within Israel, including its security establishment, make a very similar case, that it was a disastrous decision on the part of the last administration to walk away from the JCPOA and to make the case that the JCPOA is now the best alternative to the specter of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
To your question on the various viewpoints we have here at home, look, it is not for me to speak to what we’ve heard from members of Congress or what we might hear from members of Congress – in part because it’s a hypothetical. We don’t have a deal; we may not get one. If we do arrive at one, we’ll let members of Congress form their own opinions. It is our responsibility to provide them with updates on the status of those discussions, to provide them with updates on the status of Iran’s nuclear advancements, precisely what Iran has been able to do since the last administration abandoned the JCPOA. Much of that is classified; some of that is not. And the part that is unclassified is well known to all of you in this room, and I’ve said it already a couple times. What once was a breakout time that could be measured in a year has now dwindled down to a breakout time that can be measured in weeks or less. The various underlying technical assessments are in some ways just as alarming, and I think you have heard members of Congress emerge from some of these briefings and make public statements pointing to the concern that they have owing to the advancements that Iran has been able to make in its nuclear program.
So all throughout we have made very clear that we believe the best alternative to the status quo and certainly to the specter of an Iranian nuclear weapon is the JCPOA. There has always been in some ways an open invitation for anyone who thinks that there is a better approach to offer that approach. But consistently what we hear is the approach that has been tried since May of 2018 and that has demonstrably failed. This goes back to the point I made before: it’s no longer a thought experiment what would happen if we abandoned the JCPOA and tried an approach of so-called maximum pressure or if we mounted sanctions. We’ve tried that and we see the results.
QUESTION: Then why not go to the plan B that is already – I guess it should be in the back pocket.
MR PRICE: It’s – it’s something that we’ve —
QUESTION: It’s been almost 500 days now.
MR PRICE: It’s something that we’ve discussed with our allies and partners to a great extent. We absolutely will resort to that if the JCPOA proves not to be viable, if we get to a point where the deal that is on the table is not in our national security interests.
QUESTION: Can there – can – do you believe these advances —
QUESTION: (Inaudible), but can you – you talked about the countries that were quote/unquote “not wild about the JCPOA” in 2015 – 2014, 2015 having changed their tune.
MR PRICE: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Really? The Israeli security establishment and the members of the – in the GCC – sorry, where have they come out in support of this? (Inaudible.)
MR PRICE: I can point you to a public statement that emanated from Rob Malley’s engagement with the GCC I believe it was last year.
QUESTION: Can you point me to a statement from former Prime Minister Bennett or current Prime Minister —
MR PRICE: I said —
QUESTION: — Lapid in support —
MR PRICE: — of –
QUESTION: — of this? Can you point me to a statement from the GCC —
MR PRICE: Matt, but that’s not what I said. That’s not what I said.
QUESTION: — from any member of the GCC that is more than the tepid acceptance of the JCPOA in 2015 than they offered when they were really opposed and they just kind of went along with it as a favor to president – then President Obama?
MR PRICE: I’ll let their statement speak for itself, but —
QUESTION: The Israeli security establishment, the Obama administration cited similar – like, oh, behind the scenes, the Israelis really think this is a great deal. But the prime minister, the Israeli prime minister at the time, was vehemently opposed to it. And I don’t – I’m not sure you would say the Israeli – the elected leadership of Israeli is in support of it.
MR PRICE: I didn’t say that, though. I didn’t say that.
QUESTION: Well, you’re trying – you said the countries that were not wild about —
MR PRICE: No, I said —
QUESTION: — it had changed their tune.
MR PRICE: I was —
QUESTION: And in fact, they haven’t changed their tune. The Israeli Government is still opposed to it, and the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the other countries of the Gulf, while they may have said, “Eh, okay,” the same —
MR PRICE: I’m not sure those are the precise words that are in their statement, but —
QUESTION: It’s the same tepid, lukewarm support that they offered back in 2015.
MR PRICE: Well, I will —
QUESTION: So let’s not – listen, don’t try to make it seem like —
MR PRICE: Well, you’re —
QUESTION: — everyone in the world is in support of this.
MR PRICE: — you’re putting words in my mouth that I didn’t say in terms of pointing to specific leaders. Of course, I did not say that. And you have acknowledged that there are statements out there from our GCC partners. So we’ll leave that there.
Iraq.
QUESTION: One more Iran, please.
QUESTION: Although (inaudible) all the GCC countries seem to be buddying up to Iran trying to reinvigorate diplomatic relations and so on, overtly and covertly. So the Kuwaiti ambassador just turned in his, I guess, papers to Raisi and so on. So we see a lot of diplomatic movement. Maybe they are doing it their own, perhaps —
MR PRICE: We see efforts. The way we see it, these are efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region, but our Gulf partners know that there would be – nothing would de-escalate tensions the way that an Iran that is permanently and verifiably barred from obtaining a nuclear weapon would.
Iraq.
QUESTION: Iraq. Thank you.
MR PRICE: Yes.