(AGENPARL) – mer 17 agosto 2022 You are subscribed to Department Press Briefings for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available.
08/17/2022 06:58 PM EDT
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
1:38 p.m. EDT
MR PRICE: Good afternoon.
QUESTION: Good afternoon.
MR PRICE: I will turn to your questions in just a moment, but first, as you heard from Secretary Blinken earlier today, the Department of State is pleased to announce the new Colin Powell Leadership Program to advance the department’s commitment to hire a workforce representative of all segments of society and in support of the Secretary’s modernization agenda. Secretary Powell understood that diversity is, quote, “a source of strength. It is a source of our success.” And he exemplified his leadership values both as a general and as secretary of state by putting people first. The Colin Powell Leadership Program recruits highly motivated candidates from a variety of backgrounds who aspire to and possess the potential to become future Civil Service leaders here at Department of State. This program will provide paid fellowships to recent college graduates and paid internships to students who are enrolled at accredited institutions of higher learning.
We’re also creating a new fellowship for the Diplomatic Security Service in which graduate students from underrepresented communities will receive scholarships, professional development training, and mentoring. After completing the program, they’ll enter the Foreign Service as DS special agents. This fellowship will also be named for an exceptional public servant, William D. Clark, Sr., the first member of the diplomatic – of Diplomatic Security to achieve the rank of ambassador.
Both of these new initiatives represent our commitment to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility here at the department. As the Secretary said earlier today, we’ll keep working together in the decades to come to make sure our department is a place that reflects our values, looks like America, and is equipped to do the best possible work on behalf of America.
With that, Matt.
QUESTION: Thanks. Do you have any idea how many people per year will be in either of these?
MR PRICE: I don’t have those details just yet, but we will keep you posted on that.
QUESTION: Okay. Can I start – I want to start with Syria. What do you make, if anything, of the Syrian Government’s statement today – earlier today that they don’t know where Austin Tice is, they don’t have him, and they can’t help you, basically?
MR PRICE: We’ve seen that statement. We’re aware of that statement. That statement does nothing to change our fundamental position, and that is the fact that we call on the Syrian Government to ensure that Austin Tice and every U.S. national held hostage in Syria can return home. As I said just the other day when we were marking the somber anniversary of Austin Tice’s 10th year away from his family – a quarter of his life now spent away from his family – we have engaged extensively with Syrian authorities to try to get Austin home, including directly with Syrian officials, but as I mentioned at the time, Syria has never acknowledged holding him. We continue to believe that Syria has now an opportunity to help release a U.S. national. We will continue to pursue every avenue we conceivably can to secure Austin’s prompt release.
QUESTION: Well, so does that – is the long and short of it is that you don’t believe them when they say they don’t have any idea and can’t help?
MR PRICE: The fact is, Matt, as I said, the Syrian regime has never acknowledged holding Austin Tice. At the same time, you saw from the statement President Biden issued just a couple days ago on the anniversary of his 10th year away from his family, President Biden said in that statement that the U.S. Government knows with certainty that Austin Tice was held by the Syrian Government. So that is why our position is unchanged. We continue to call upon the Syrian Government to use its influence to do everything it can – and we believe that it can do so on its own – to help secure the release of Austin Tice.
QUESTION: Well, and I am sorry for harping on this, but – and I know it’s sensitive – but I mean, does that mean that you still – you think – I mean, when you say the President said in his statement that you knew – know with certainty that at least one point the Syrian Government had custody of him, can you say that with certainty now?
MR PRICE: We believe to this very day that Syria still has the power to release Austin Tice. That is why we are calling on the Syrian regime to do just that.
QUESTION: Thank you, Ned. South Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol said at a press conference on the 100 days of his inauguration yesterday in order to realize the bold plan for North Korea, he said that he would further pursue the North Korea or in some case of pressure it through sanctions to participation in denuclearizations. Will the United States continue to maintain sanctions to denuclearize North Korea?
MR PRICE: We will. We will continue to maintain those sanctions until and unless the underlying conduct, the underlying activity changes and North Korea alters its fundamental approach. As I said just the other day – earlier this week, I think – we strongly support what we have heard from President Yoon. We support the ROK’s aim to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with North Korea. It is not only our goal, it is our shared and collective goal to see the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we are committed to working very closely with President Yoon, with his team, with our allies in the ROK, with our allies in Japan, trilaterally together with our Japanese and South Korean allies, but also with our broader set of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Our commitment in the face of the DPRK’s continued provocations to the security of our allies, including the ROK and Japan, of course, in the Indo-Pacific is ironclad. Until and unless the DPRK changes its approach and takes us up on our offer of pragmatic and practical dialogue and diplomacy leading towards that ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, we’ll continue to coordinate closely with our allies both to seek engagement but also to ensure that the DPRK is held accountable, held accountable for its continued provocations and, in some cases, its continued violation of UN Security Council resolutions, including with its recent launches of ballistic missiles.
So we will continue to do both those things in furtherance of that broader goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: On North Korea, North Korea fired two cruise missiles already this morning, as you maybe know already, despite the South Korea proposal. How can you analyze this because North Korea already proposal to denuclearize (inaudible)?
MR PRICE: I don’t have a specific comment on reports of alleged cruise missile launches this morning. What I’ll say is what I reiterated just a moment ago, that we remain focused on coordinating closely with our treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific, namely Japan and the ROK, on that shared objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) early they fired these missiles. That’s why (inaudible) maybe look at this why they were – their purpose to fire these missiles, but the United States (inaudible) analyze this as soon as possible.
MR PRICE: It’s always difficult, especially from the podium, to divine or attempt to assess the motivations of any particular action. I think looking over the longer arc, especially in recent years, where the DPRK’s provocations, including its launches of ballistic missiles, including ICBMs and ICBM technology – those are clear provocations. They are a clear threat to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and potentially beyond, and that is really at the crux of our determination to continue working closely with our treaty allies and with other allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific and well beyond.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR PRICE: Ian.
QUESTION: I’m wondering if you had any response to the Chinese ambassador’s comments yesterday about congressional visits to Taiwan being inappropriate and warning of a Chinese response if the U.S. Navy sailed into the Taiwan Strait.
MR PRICE: I don’t have a specific response beyond what you have heard from us since the most recent provocation, since the most recent response from the PRC. And we have repeatedly made the point that the PRC has engaged in, in some ways dangerous, in escalatory, in aggressive military responses to what was nothing more than a peaceful visit on the part of the Speaker of the House. Congressional delegations routinely travel to Taiwan. A Speaker of the House has previously traveled to Taiwan. Such travel is entirely consistent with our “one China” policy. It is consistent with the status quo that we have sought to defend and to preserve, not only in recent months but over the course of the past four decades or so.
What we have noted – again, going back some time now – is that Beijing – it is Beijing that has stepped up its pressure on Taiwan across multiple domains. It has sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. It has sought to intimidate Taiwan with military pressure and tactics. It has sought to interfere with its democratic processes. And these actions, as I alluded to just a moment ago, beyond posing additional risks, they’ve undermined the status quo and, in turn, the underpinnings of peace and stability in the strait, in the Taiwan Strait. And what we’re seeing now appears to be just the beginning stages of an intensification of those efforts. We’ve already seen, as I alluded to a moment ago, an uptick in military intimidation tactics to an unprecedented level and an increase in coercive economic tactics. We expect these practices – these practices, these tactics, will continue in the days and weeks ahead. China – although China says that its planned military exercises have concluded, it has maintained a heightened level of air and maritime activity around Taiwan and it has made clear it will continue to do so.
So, for our part, we will continue to take steps that are resolute but also calm to uphold peace and stability in the face of Beijing’s ongoing efforts to undermine the status quo. We will continue to do all that we can consistent with our “one China” policy, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, consistent with the Six Assurances and the Three Joint Communiques, to support Taiwan in line with our longstanding policy. And these steps across a range of areas will unfold over the coming weeks and months because we recognize that this challenge is a long-term one. We are prepared to work with Taiwan. We’re prepared to continue to work with our allies and partners, and our support for Taiwan, as it always has been, will be commensurate with the threat that it faces.
QUESTION: Yeah, some other military exercises involving China. The Russian exercises in the east the Chinese are sending troops to. I wonder if that, the fact that Chinese troops are going to Russia to take part in joint military exercises, does that represent that – the warnings that you were giving a few months ago to China not to militarily support the Russians in the war in Ukraine? Does this sort of change your thinking in the way that the Chinese have responded to that? And is it still the case that you think the Chinese haven’t offered military support for the war in Ukraine?
MR PRICE: My understanding is that these are joint exercises that involve a number of countries well beyond Russia and China. Countries routinely make their own sovereign decisions. It is absolutely their right to do so regarding what, if any, military exercises to take part in. I’ll also note that most of the participating countries also routinely participate in a wide array of military exercises and exchanges with the United States as well. So we don’t read anything into their engagement in this activity.
Now, the broader point is that we have seen a burgeoning relationship, including in the security realm, between the PRC and Russia. We’ve seen a burgeoning relationship between Russia and Iran, for example, and we have made public elements of that. That is of concern because of the vision that the PRC, countries like the PRC, countries like Russia, have for the international order. It is a vision that is starkly at odds to the liberal vision that we and our allies and partners have for the international system. It is starkly at odds with the underpinnings of the international system that have been in place for some eight decades following the end of the Second World War, a system that has undergirded unprecedented levels of stability, of security, of prosperity across the world. That includes in Europe; that includes in the Indo-Pacific, and everywhere in between.
It is the difference between a profoundly liberal order and a profoundly illiberal order in which all of the principles that the United States, that our allies, that our partners, that the United Nations, and that, by the way, countries like Russia and China, have previously stood for and in some cases still profess to stand for – it is a vision that is profoundly opposed to many of those principles.
To your specific question about the provision of PRC military assistance to Russia and its effort against Ukraine, of course our concern and our admonitions have always been in the context of potential PRC military assistance or systemic assistance for – to help Russia evade the impact of U.S. and international sanctions. We’ve been very clear in our engagements with the PRC regarding the consequences of doing so. We have yet to see any change in the PRC’s behavior indicating that they are moving in that direction.
QUESTION: And you mentioned there are other countries involved in the exercises. That includes India. The fact that India is still – like you said, they take part in exercises with other countries. But doesn’t that represent a sort of failure of your approach or your attempts to create a global message against the – against Russia, like an isolation of the Russian military, the fact that a U.S. partner like India is still doing this?
MR PRICE: So I’ll make a couple of points. One, we have conveyed the message around the world – and you recently heard the Secretary send this message during his travel in Africa; just before that he delivered this same message in the Indo-Pacific; we’ve done so in the Western Hemisphere as well – it is not that countries need to choose between the United States and any other country. It is not that we see the world in zero sum terms, all or nothing, all in with the United States or not at all. The fact is that we recognize that there are countries around the world – well, every country around the world is going to make its own sovereign decisions based on its own assessment of its interests and its values. It is incumbent upon us to make clear how our shared interests and our shared values often do align, and the dividends that countries around the world could reap from partnership.
At the same time, we also recognize that there are countries around the world that have longstanding relationships, including security relationships, with countries like Russia, for example, and reorienting a country’s foreign policy or a country’s security establishment or defense procurement practices away from a country like Russia is not something that we can do overnight. It’s not something that we can do over the course of weeks or even months. We do see this as a long-term challenge.
And to your point about Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine, we are confident that the brutality that Moscow has wielded inside Ukraine, the – Moscow’s unabashed trampling of the principles that have been at the core of the international order for eight decades has been a wakeup call for countries around the world. And it has helped to put a spotlight on the distinction between what countries like the United States stand for and what countries like Russia, on the other hand, stand for.
And so we are continuing – we continue to be confident that as we engage with countries around the world, as we make clear the type of partnership we seek, and the dividends that that partnership would wield for both the United States and for countries around the world, that countries will increasingly seek to partner with the United States, countries will increasingly continue to stand against what Russia’s doing in Ukraine, and the ways in which it is undermining the international order in Europe and around the world.
QUESTION: And I can’t say that I’m surprised that you declined the invitation to become the first spokesman to admit from the podium that a U.S. policy has been a failure. But that said, as it relates to India, his question about failure in your approach – but your point has been, since the invasion of Ukraine, that it can’t be business as usual with the Russians regardless of whether any of these countries have longstanding, decades-long strategic, military, economic ties with Russia and previously the Soviet Union. So isn’t this business as usual? Isn’t this not – I mean, India, after all, is a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. It’s part of the Quad. It’s a country that you guys are building a huge – trying to build the Indo-Pacific Strategy around, or one of the three others.
MR PRICE: If you take a step back, Matt, it is not business as usual. And we’ve heard that —
QUESTION: For the – isn’t this – isn’t joining a military exercise —
MR PRICE: If you – across the wider perspective, we have worked very closely with our Indian partners bilaterally, through the Quad as well, to signal, and the Indians have done so very clearly, the – what should be the inviolable principle of state sovereignty. We’ve —
QUESTION: They’ve increased their imports of Russian oil. They’ve increased their imports of Russian fertilizers. They’re doing this military exercise. They’re about to buy – do what the Turks did kind of and buy – potentially buy the Russian air defense systems. Is – how is that not business as usual?
MR PRICE: It —
QUESTION: The exact – the exact same thing that you’ve been telling countries not to.
MR PRICE: It’s not for me to speak to another country’s foreign policy. But what I can do is point out what we have heard, statements from India. We have seen countries around the world speak clearly, including with their votes in the UN General Assembly, against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But we also recognize, as I was saying just a moment ago, that this is not flipping a light switch. This is something that especially for countries that have historical relationships with Russia, relationships that, as is the case with India, extend back decades, it is going to be a long-term proposition to reorient foreign policy away from Russia.
QUESTION: You know this is just – you guys – you said it is “not for me to speak to another country’s foreign policy.” You do that every day.
MR PRICE: It’s – it is my job – it is my —
QUESTION: That’s why you get up here every day, to speak to other countries’ foreign policy.
MR PRICE: It is my job to speak to – it is my job to speak to our foreign policy. Sometimes there’s a very close nexus between our foreign policy and that of other countries.,
QUESTION: Thanks so much, Ned. I have a couple questions, but let me start with Vostok 2022 just to stay on this line. One of the countries that will be part of the military exercises is Belarus, whose territory is in part being used to attack Ukraine. Does that change your approach in terms of how to view those – these drills? And any message you want to send to Belarus in that context?
MR PRICE: Belarus’s participation in these exercises doesn’t fundamentally change our approach. What has fundamentally contoured our approach is the fact that the Lukashenka regime has opened Belarus’s doors. The regime has set aside what should be Belarus’s own sovereignty and independence and, in a way, its territorial integrity by permitting Russia’s forces onto, again, what should be sovereign Belarusian soil to launch a brutal, premeditated, unjustified attack against its neighbor to the south. That is, in addition to the human rights abuses, in addition to the Lukashenka regime’s clinging onto power following the fraudulent elections, in addition to its persecution of political prisoners, in addition to what it is doing to seek to trample on the civil rights and civil liberties of the Belarusian people – that is what alters our fundamental view of this regime.
QUESTION: On that, there are concerns on the Hill that we don’t have an ambassador right now to Belarus with your recent departure of Ambassador Fisher. The question is yesterday marked three years from the Minsk process. Are you in touch with the opposition, or who is the highest-ranked U.S. diplomat right now and where is he or she right now?
MR PRICE: We are routinely in touch with the Belarusian opposition. In fact, Secretary Blinken has had an opportunity just within the past several months to meet in person with Ms. Tsikhanouskaya. Other senior officials here have been in communication with her, with other leading opposition figures, but other icons of the Belarusian people, individuals who represent the democratic aspirations of a sovereign, independent Belarus, something that cannot be said of the Lukashenka regime.
QUESTION: Can we go to Iran?
MR PRICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Have you guys responded yet to the EU after reviewing Iran’s responses to their proposition?
MR PRICE: So I don’t have much to offer you beyond what we said yesterday. As I noted at the time, we had received Iran’s comments via the EU. We are studying them. That was the case yesterday; that continues to be the case today. We are engaged in consultations with the EU as well as with our European allies on the way ahead. And you’ve heard us say again and again, especially in recent days, we ultimately agree with the bottom-line proposition of High Representative Borrell. The reason he put forward this proposal in the first place was out of recognition that what could be negotiated has been negotiated. The high representative, and the way in which he has handled this process, has certainly narrowed the scope of that conversation. It has crystalized the decision for Iran. We have been sincere, we have been steadfast in our commitment to seeking a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA, and we’re grateful for Mr. Borrell and the efforts he’s undertaken to seek to get us there.
QUESTION: And do you have any time frame for when you’ll be providing a response to the EU?
MR PRICE: I don’t; not one that I can provide publicly, at least. But again, we have been in communication with the EU, we’ve been in communication with other European allies on the way ahead.
QUESTION: And just one more question. Can you elaborate a little bit more as to why the Biden administration is confident that the U.S. would be able to uphold the commitments that are in the current deal as it stands now given that it hinges on actions taken by Congress, and this building lifting some Iranians from the SDN list, and the like? Like, are you confident that those actions would be taken if you guys got back into the deal?
MR PRICE: Kylie, we look at this through the lens not of politics but of national security. And we are confident that a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA remains the best and really the most effective means by which to once again verifiably and permanently constrain Iran’s nuclear program. The fact is that in the years in which we have not had a JCPOA, since May of 2018, Iran’s nuclear program has galloped forward in a way that is deeply concerning and alarming given where we were when the JCPOA was in full effect in terms of Iran’s breakout time, to where we are now with a breakout time that can be measured not in a year, not in months, but in weeks or potentially even less.
So that has – that for us is the guiding principle here. It’s the national security concerns, it is the security concerns that our partners have expressed as well. The specter of an Iranian nuclear weapon would not pose a threat only to the United States, but to allies and partners around the world. And that’s why from the start we’ve been sincere and steadfast in seeking to effect a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA.
We understand that Congress needs to be a partner in this endeavor as well. That is why we have routinely updated our members and their staffs on the Hill regarding the status of discussions, whether those have been in Vienna, whether those have been in Doha, whether those have been remote. We will continue to do that knowing that our foreign policy is ultimately going to be much more effective if it is conducted with the full support of Congress.
QUESTION: And have you guys briefed Congress on the EU proposition at all? When’s the last time you briefed them?
MR PRICE: We engage in regular discussions with members and their staffs. I don’t have a recent briefing or hearing to note for you, but it is something that happens regularly.
QUESTION: Ned, on Iran?
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR PRICE: Sticking on Iran? Sure. On Iran still?
QUESTION: No, no, I would like —
MR PRICE: Okay, let’s – let’s —
QUESTION: — Western Balkans?
MR PRICE: Let’s – let’s finish out Iran.
QUESTION: Yeah, have you put any offer on the table to Iran for a prisoner swap?
MR PRICE: From the earliest days of this administration, we have made clear, unambiguously clear, to Iran the priority we attach to the return of the Americans and the dual nationals that Iran is wrongfully holding. I imagine you’re referring to what we heard from Iran recently. It has been our goal from the start to see these Americans released. Even before the process began in earnest in Vienna, we made that clear to Iran. During the course of negotiations in Vienna, during the course of negotiations in Doha, during the course of indirect discussions with the Iranians, we have also consistently conveyed that message in an unambiguous way to Iran.
QUESTION: Is there any serious dialogue now to release them? Is there any step that we should wait for?
MR PRICE: So we’ve had two imperatives in this. One is to do all we can to seek the prompt and safe return of the Americans who are wrongfully detained in Iran, but also, secondly, not to do anything that could jeopardize or that could slow or that could hinder the release of Americans who are wrongfully detained in Iran. So as is typically the case, we don’t detail exactly where we are, we don’t detail the specifics of any of these engagements or these messages, but what I can say with confidence is that we have made unambiguously clear to Iran the priority we attach to this.
QUESTION: Still on Iran?
MR PRICE: Still on Iran? Sure.
QUESTION: There are some reports in the Middle East that the Iranian comments stayed within the scope of the JCPOA. Can you confirm this?
MR PRICE: I can’t, and this is somewhat related to the point I was just making to Michel. Very different issue, but same principle at play. We are not going to detail publicly the state of these discussions or these negotiations. We’re making our views known privately and directly to the EU.
QUESTION: Finally. Thank you. So tomorrow in Brussels, on the EU-led dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo – so if you can tell me specifically, what is the U.S. expectations in terms of the outcome for tomorrow’s meeting? And on the scale from zero to ten, where would you situate the priority Kosovo-Serbia crisis is for United States?
MR PRICE: Well, broadly, we are pleased that Serbia and Kosovo leaders will meet in Brussels under the EU-facilitated dialogue tomorrow. We fully support this dialogue. It’s important, we believe, that both parties use this opportunity to advance their discussions on normalization. It is a priority of ours. We would like to see progress made in implementation of past dialogue agreements.
Dialogue and compromise are critical components of governance; they are not signs of weakness. They are both essential to reach a locally owned agreement on normalization of relations, which remains fundamental to both countries’ EU aspirations. And we’re hopeful that leaders in Serbia and Kosovo understand the importance of moving forward, not backward, through the EU-facilitated dialogue.
A senior official here from the department will travel to Brussels to support the leaders meeting in this EU-facilitated dialogue. We are not a direct participant in these talks, but the success of these talks, to your second question – and I’m always loath to give rankings or gradings, numerical or otherwise – but it is an absolute priority of ours.
(AGENPARL) – mer 17 agosto 2022 You are subscribed to Department Press Briefings for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available.